We investigate whether improvements in banks' organizational capital and control systems facilitate increased loan origination to minority borrowers. We focus on bank supervisors' enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) against banks and hypothesize that EDO-imposed improvements in loan policies, internal governance, and employee training mitigate deficiencies in credit assessments and lending decisions that previously disadvantaged minority borrowers. We find that mortgage origination to minority borrowers increases following the resolution of EDOs, and more so for banks with stricter supervisors or more severe EDOs. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to analyze the text of EDOs, we find that such increases are higher for EDOs specifying revisions of loan policies, implementation of formal internal governance procedures, or more employee training. Overall, we find that EDO-driven improvements in organizational capital generate unintended, positive social externalities that enhance access to credit for minority borrowers.

中文翻译：

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银行监管与组织资本：少数贷款案例

我们调查银行组织资本和控制系统的改进是否有助于增加对少数借款人的贷款发放。我们重点关注银行监管机构针对银行的执行决定和命令 (EDO)，并假设 EDO 在贷款政策、内部治理和员工培训方面实施的改进可以缓解信用评估和贷款决策方面的缺陷，这些缺陷此前使少数借款人处于不利地位。我们发现，随着 EDO 的解决，少数借款人的抵押贷款发放量有所增加，对于监管更严格或更严厉的 EDO 的银行来说更是如此。使用半监督机器学习方法来分析 EDO 的文本，我们发现对于指定修改贷款政策、实施正式内部治理程序或更多员工培训的 EDO，这种增长更高。总体而言，我们发现 EDO 驱动的组织资本改善会产生意想不到的积极社会外部性，从而增强少数族裔借款人获得信贷的机会。