The safety concerns for autonomous vehicles (AV) are shown to be a roadblock to their adoption. This paper addresses these concerns by studying a unified, game-theoretic framework (leader–follower game) of mixed traffic in which AVs and human-driven vehicles (HV) coexist, with endogenous vehicle demand and different types of accidents emerging in mixed traffic as crucial building blocks. We study the interaction between three types of players: (i) a policymaker, who decides on the liability regime and the level of V2I connectivity infrastructure, (ii) an AV producer, who decides on the AV price and safety level, and (iii) consumers, who differ in their preference for each vehicle type and choose the one they like best. Using both analytical and numerical tools, we analyze how the two policy variables, liability and V2I connectivity, affect behavior on the demand and supply side of the vehicle market and, in turn, AV market penetration and overall road safety. We also characterize optimal policies, thereby taking into account the market participants’ behavioral responses. Our findings provide guidance for a fast adoption of AVs and a smooth transition from existing traffic conditions to a mixed traffic environment, and assist in decision making for policymakers, legal agencies, traffic operation and transportation planning agencies, as well as car manufacturers.

中文翻译：

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自动驾驶汽车政策与安全投资：内生需求的均衡分析

自动驾驶汽车 (AV) 的安全问题已被证明是其采用的障碍。本文通过研究混合交通的统一博弈论框架（领导者-追随者博弈）来解决这些问题，其中自动驾驶汽车和人类驾驶车辆（HV）共存，内生的车辆需求和混合交通中出现的不同类型的事故如下：关键的组成部分。我们研究三类参与者之间的相互作用：(i) 政策制定者，决定责任制度和 V2I 连接基础设施的水平；(ii) AV 生产商，决定 AV 价格和安全水平；(iii) ）消费者对每种车型的偏好不同，并选择他们最喜欢的一款。我们使用分析和数值工具，分析了责任和 V2I 连接这两个政策变量如何影响汽车市场供需双方的行为，进而影响自动驾驶汽车市场渗透率和整体道路安全。我们还描述了最优政策，从而考虑到市场参与者的行为反应。我们的研究结果为自动驾驶汽车的快速采用以及从现有交通状况向混合交通环境的平稳过渡提供了指导，并协助政策制定者、法律机构、交通运营和交通规划机构以及汽车制造商做出决策。