A core feature of Kant’s Critical account of moral motivation is that pure reason can be practical by itself. I argue that Kant developed this view in the 1770s concerning the principium diiudicationis and principium executionis. These principles indicate the normative and performative aspects of moral motivation. I demonstrate that cognition of the normative principle effects the moral incentive. So, the hallmark of Kant’s Critical account of motivation was contained in his pre-Critical view. This interpretation resolves a controversy about Kant’s apparent eudaimonism in the first Critique and shows that he developed his account of moral autonomy in the 1770s.

中文翻译：

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康德的审判原理和执行原理

康德对道德动机的批判性解释的一个核心特征是纯粹理性本身就可以实践。我认为康德在 1770 年代发展了这一关于区分原则和执行原则。这些原则表明了道德动机的规范性和执行性方面。我证明对规范原则的认知会影响道德激励。因此，康德对动机的批判性解释的标志包含在他的前批判观点中。这种解释首先解决了关于康德表面上的幸福主义的争议。批判并表明他在 1770 年代发展了他对道德自主的解释。