Government agencies rely on general deterrence to protect the public. Firms utilize lobbying for influence and information purposes. This paper explores the intersection of general deterrence and lobbying by firms while investigating whether general deterrence efforts of regulators are met with a lobbying response. Specifically, we propose that following a competitor firm being sanctioned, the non-sanctioned peer firms will increase their amount of lobbying targeted at the sanctioning agency, and the key drivers of these increases in targeted lobbying will be penalty severity, concerns over likely reputational damage, and value alignment. We test our hypotheses using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency violations as a context, and they largely receive support.

中文翻译：

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同行对监管执法的反应：未经制裁的公司进行游说

政府机构依靠普遍威慑来保护公众。公司利用游说来达到影响力和信息的目的。本文探讨了一般威慑与企业游说的交叉点，同时调查监管机构的一般威慑努力是否得到游说回应。具体来说，我们建议，在竞争对手公司受到制裁后，未受制裁的同行公司将增加针对制裁机构的游说数量，而这些针对性游说增加的主要驱动因素将是处罚的严厉程度以及对可能的声誉损害的担忧和值对齐。我们以美国环境保护局的违规行为为背景来检验我们的假设，这些假设在很大程度上得到了支持。