Tradable credit schemes (TCS) have been receiving increasing attention as an alternative to congestion pricing due to considerations of equity and revenue neutrality. Although it is typically assumed that credit transactions occur between travelers directly, i.e., via peer-to-peer (P2P) trading, the underlying mechanism that achieves market clearing (in terms of matching of sellers and buyers and pricing of credits) has not been studied in sufficient detail. This study extends the current literature on TCS by proposing two types of P2P trading paradigms that define the rules of matching selling and buying orders, market price adjustment, and the individual bidding format. Together with a peer-to-regulator (P2R) design, all trading paradigms are tested in the context of the morning commute problem under a given distance-based time-of-day credit tariff scheme. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed P2P trading paradigms – in the absence of transaction costs – lead to a near identical equilibrium in terms of social welfare gains, departure flows, and credit price as that obtained from P2R schemes. Further, the P2P trading mechanisms ensure budget neutrality of credits as well as revenue neutrality of the regulator during the day-to-day process.

中文翻译：

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具有点对点交易机制的可交易信贷计划

出于公平和收入中性的考虑，可交易信贷计划（TCS）作为拥堵定价的替代方案越来越受到关注。尽管通常假设信用交易直接发生在旅行者之间，即通过点对点（P2P）交易，但实现市场出清的基本机制（在卖家和买家的匹配以及信用定价方面）尚未被阐明。研究得足够详细。本研究通过提出两种类型的 P2P 交易范式扩展了当前关于 TCS 的文献，这些范式定义了买卖订单匹配规则、市场价格调整和个人投标格式。与点对点监管机构 (P2R) 设计一起，所有交易范例都在给定的基于距离的分时信贷费率方案下，在早上通勤问题的背景下进行测试。数值结果表明，所提出的 P2P 交易范式（在没有交易成本的情况下）在社会福利收益、离开流量和信贷价格方面与 P2R 方案获得的均衡几乎相同。此外，P2P交易机制确保了日常过程中信贷的预算中立以及监管机构的收入中立。