How does third-party diplomatic and material support affect rebel groups’ use of terrorism in civil wars? We argue via a game-theoretic model that diplomatic support prompts prospective shifts in rebel tactics, from civilian to military targets, in anticipation of material support, while material support alters the cost structure of attacks, leading to the same tactical shift. We empirically test the model’s implications using an original dataset of UN resolutions about countries in civil wars as well as a case study of South Africa. In support of our theory, we find that both diplomatic resolutions and material interventions in favor of the rebels are associated with rebel tactical shifts, leading to decreased reliance on violence against civilians. These findings demonstrate the value of modeling civilian and military targeting as substitutes rather than examining civilian targeting in isolation.

中文翻译：

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外交声明和内战中恐怖主义的战略使用

第三方外交和物质支持如何影响叛乱组织在内战中使用恐怖主义？我们通过博弈论模型认为，外交支持会促使叛军战术发生预期转变，从民用目标转向军事目标，以期获得物质支持，而物质支持会改变攻击的成本结构，从而导致相同的战术转变。我们使用联合国有关内战国家决议的原始数据集以及南非的案例研究来实证测试该模型的影响。为了支持我们的理论，我们发现有利于叛军的外交决议和物质干预都与叛军的战术转变有关，从而减少了对平民暴力的依赖。这些发现证明了将民用和军事目标作为替代品建模的价值，而不是孤立地检查民用目标。