Why do some rebel organizations form a united front when others confine themselves to a loose partnership? Existing research on rebel movements reveals that insurgents should quickly leave cooperative agreements if doing so will provide particular advantages in a post-conflict setting. Still, rebel groups may build diverse alliances, from joint attacks to shared command structures. If rebels are indeed purely pragmatic, why would they tie themselves to partnerships that hinder their ability to defect easily? In this article, I argue that three relational factors shape how armed groups cooperate: rebel-civilian relations (civilian support), inter-rebel relations (partners), and rebel-sponsor relations (external patrons). Groups connected through these social networks will be more likely to join a united opposition with their shared channels of trust. Developing a new dyadic dataset, I find that sharing allies or civilian support is positively associated with forming united fronts. Yet, state sponsorship does not produce similar results.

中文翻译：

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合作之路：反叛联盟形成的关系理论

为什么一些反叛组织结成了统一战线，而另一些反叛组织则局限于松散的伙伴关系？对叛乱运动的现有研究表明，如果叛乱分子能够在冲突后环境中提供特殊优势，那么叛乱分子应该迅速退出合作协议。尽管如此，叛乱组织可能会建立不同的联盟，从联合攻击到共享指挥结构。如果反叛者确实是纯粹务实的，为什么他们会把自己与阻碍他们轻易叛逃的伙伴关系联系起来呢？在本文中，我认为三个关系因素决定了武装团体的合作方式：叛乱分子与平民的关系（平民支持）、叛乱分子之间的关系（合作伙伴）以及叛乱分子与支持者的关系（外部赞助人）。通过这些社交网络联系起来的群体将更有可能凭借共同的信任渠道加入联合反对派。在开发一个新的二元数据集时，我发现分享盟友或民间支持与形成统一战线呈正相关。然而，国家赞助并没有产生类似的结果。