Research examining the antecedents instead of consequences of recalls is relatively sparse and has not considered whether firms’ likelihood to recall products is influenced by legal changes that could induce managerial opportunism, such as those reducing shareholder litigation risk. To examine this question, the authors exploit the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws across different states in the U.S. as a quasi-natural experiment. UD laws aim to prevent frivolous litigation from disrupting a firm’s normal business operations by making it more difficult for shareholders to sue managers for neglecting their fiduciary duties and hold them personally liable. Although UD laws are well-intended, the reduced threat of shareholder litigation disciplining a firm’s managers could have unintended negative consequences. Indeed, using a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis, the authors find that following the adoption of UD laws, affected firms become less likely to recall products. This effect is weaker in the presence of organizational mechanisms constraining managers’ self-interest-seeking behavior, such as a corporate culture focused on customer needs and interests or the exercise of normative control through monitoring by institutional investors. The authors do not find support for a potential alternative explanation of operational improvement and therefore higher product quality driving their findings.

中文翻译：

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EXPRESS：所以，起诉我……如果可以的话！法律变更降低了管理者被股东追究责任的风险，如何影响公司召回产品的可能性

研究召回的前因而不是后果的研究相对较少，并且没有考虑公司召回产品的可能性是否受到可能引发管理层机会主义的法律变化的影响，例如减少股东诉讼风险的法律变化。为了研究这个问题，作者利用美国不同州交错采用的普遍需求（UD）法作为准自然实验。UD 法旨在防止无意义的诉讼扰乱公司的正常业务运营，让股东更难起诉管理者忽视其信托义务并追究他们的个人责任。尽管UD法的初衷是好的，但减少股东诉讼对公司经理进行纪律处分的威胁可能会产生意想不到的负面后果。事实上，通过双重差分 (DiD) 分析，作者发现，在 UD 法通过后，受影响的公司召回产品的可能性降低。如果存在限制管理者谋取私利行为的组织机制，例如关注客户需求和利益的企业文化或通过机构投资者的监督实施规范控制，这种效应就会减弱。作者没有找到对运营改进的潜在替代解释的支持，因此更高的产品质量推动了他们的发现。