Cyber operations ranging from deception and espionage to disruption and high-end degradation have become a central feature of modern statecraft in the digital age, yet we lack a clear understanding of how decision-makers employ and respond to cyber operations in times of crisis. Our research provides theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence for understanding how decision-makers react to cyber triggers and utilize cyber responses during crises. Specifically, we argue that the availability of cyber response creates off-ramps for non-escalatory engagement. Based on experimental wargames involving rival states with power parity in militarized disputes and randomized cyber triggers and response options, we find the availability of cyber response options reduces escalatory behavior via a substitution mechanism. In the absence of cyber response options, however, participants pursue more conventional, escalatory actions, regardless of the triggering mechanism. Our findings underscore how enhancing the availability of cyber response options might reduce strategic escalation risks and offer the space to bargain during periods of conflict.

中文翻译：

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网络作战如何减少升级压力：来自实验性兵棋研究的证据

从欺骗和间谍活动到破坏和高端退化，网络行动已成为数字时代现代治国之术的核心特征，但我们对决策者在危机时期如何运用和应对网络行动缺乏清晰的了解。我们的研究提供了理论机制和经验证据，以帮助理解决策者如何对网络触发因素做出反应并在危机期间利用网络响应。具体来说，我们认为网络响应的可用性为非升级性接触创造了出口。基于涉及军事争端中实力对等的敌对国家以及随机网络触发和响应选项的实验性兵棋推演，我们发现网络响应选项的可用性通过替代机制减少了升级行为。然而，在缺乏网络响应选项的情况下，无论触发机制如何，参与者都会采取更传统的升级行动。我们的研究结果强调了增强网络响应选项的可用性如何可以降低战略升级风险并在冲突期间提供讨价还价的空间。