This study examines whether mandatory increase in reporting frequency exacerbates agency problems. Utilizing the setting of the 2004 SEC mandate on increased reporting frequency of mutual fund holdings, we show that increased reporting frequency elevates window dressing (buying winners or selling losers shortly before the end of the reporting period). This effect is driven by low-skill fund managers’ incentives to generate mixed signals. Funds managed by low-skill managers experience lower returns, more outflows, and a higher collapse rate when their window dressing is elevated after the 2004 rule change. These results suggest that, although higher reporting frequency on agents’ actions can exacerbate signal manipulations, the related manipulation costs improve sorting among agents in the longer term.

中文翻译：

---

透明度错误？共同基金更高的报告频率、门面装饰和业绩

本研究探讨强制增加报告频率是否会加剧机构问题。利用 2004 年美国证券交易委员会关于增加共同基金持有量报告频率的规定，我们发现报告频率的增加会加剧门面装饰（在报告期结束前不久买入赢家或卖出输家）。这种效应是由低技能基金经理产生混合信号的动机驱动的。 2004 年规则变更后，当门面装饰升级时，由低技能经理管理的基金会经历较低的回报、更多的资金外流和更高的崩盘率。这些结果表明，尽管对智能体行为的较高报告频率可能会加剧信号操纵，但从长远来看，相关的操纵成本会改善智能体之间的分类。