We examine how executive compensation can be designed to facilitate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the U.S. Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices. We argue this made collusion more appealing to shareholders, and find that these firms increased the sensitivity of executive pay to local rivals' performance, consistent with rewarding the managers for colluding with them. The affected CEOs were also granted longer vesting periods, which provides long-term incentives that could foster collusive arrangements.

中文翻译：

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激发共谋

我们研究了如何设计高管薪酬以促进产品市场共谋。我们回顾了 2013 年关闭美国司法部多个地区办事处的决定，该决定降低了对这些已关闭办事处附近公司的反垄断执法力度。我们认为，这使得共谋对股东更具吸引力，并发现这些公司提高了高管薪酬对当地竞争对手业绩的敏感性，这与奖励与他们共谋的经理是一致的。受影响的首席执行官还获得了更长的归属期，这提供了可能助长串通安排的长期激励。