When firms are forced to publicly disclose financial information, credit rating agencies are generally expected to improve their risk assessments. Theory predicts such an information quality effect but also suggests an adverse reputational concerns effect since credit analysts may become increasingly concerned about alleged rating failures. We empirically examine these predictions using a large-scale quasi-natural experiment in Germany, where a new compliance regime required firms to disclose annual financial statements publicly. Consistent with the reputational concerns hypothesis, we find an average increase in credit rating downgrades that is entirely driven by changes in the discretionary assessments of credit analysts rather than changes in firm fundamentals. Following public disclosure regulations, analysts tend to give positive private information less weight in their risk assessments while assigning greater weight to negative public information. A final set of results indicates that professional credit providers recognize that the resulting downgrades are not warranted.

中文翻译：

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强制性财务信息披露和信用评级


当公司被迫公开披露财务信息时，信用评级机构通常会改进其风险评估。理论预测了这种信息质量效应，但也表明了不利的声誉担忧效应，因为信用分析师可能越来越担心所谓的评级失败。我们在德国进行了一项大规模的准自然实验，对这些预测进行了实证检验，其中新的合规制度要求公司公开披露年度财务报表。与声誉问题假说一致，我们发现信用评级降级的平均增加完全是由信用分析师酌情评估的变化而不是公司基本面的变化驱动的。根据公开披露规定，分析师在风险评估中往往会降低积极的私人信息的权重，而对负面的公共信息给予更大的权重。最终的一组结果表明，专业信贷提供商认识到由此产生的降级是没有道理的。