We investigate an intriguing strategy where rival content platforms jointly launch a membership bundle that allows consumers to access both of their platforms at a reduced price. We highlight that this approach transforms the platform relationship from pure competition to coopetition. Using a game-theoretical model, we show how a membership bundle significantly influences additional content distribution and acquisition outcomes and the associated welfare implications. We further undertake various extensions to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. We enrich the understanding of platform coopetition and derive practical implications with relevance for both platforms and content providers.

中文翻译：

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内容平台中的会员捆绑：捆绑决策和内容分发


我们研究了一种有趣的策略，即竞争对手的内容平台联合推出会员捆绑包，允许消费者以较低的价格访问他们的两个平台。我们强调，这种方法将平台关系从纯粹的竞争转变为合作。使用博弈论模型，我们展示了会员捆绑如何显着影响额外的内容分发和获取结果以及相关的福利影响。我们进一步进行各种扩展以证明我们研究结果的稳健性。我们丰富了对平台合作的理解，并得出与平台和内容提供商相关的实际意义。