Due to a dearth of data, nineteenth century lending to sovereign borrowers was a blind date. We argue this is the reason for collateral pledges found in contemporary lending covenants, which enabled not execution, but the production of reliable fiscal data. Lawyers injected collateral clauses in sovereign debt covenants to permit credible disclosure of hard-to-access tax data. The study foregrounds the importance of big law firms as financial intermediaries and information producers. It also contributes a new view on the role played by contracts in sovereign debt. “No [underwriting] firm can take precautions against the repudiation of a [sovereign] hypothecation.”—Thomas Baring, 1865

中文翻译：

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主权抵押品

由于数据的消亡，十九世纪向主权借款人提供的贷款是一次相亲。我们认为，这就是当代贷款契约中存在抵押品承诺的原因，这些契约不是执行，而是产生可靠的财政数据。律师在主权债务契约中加入了抵押条款，以允许可靠地披露难以获取的税务数据。该研究强调了大型律师事务所作为金融中介和信息生产者的重要性。它还有助于人们对合同在主权债务中所扮演的角色产生新的看法。“没有任何[承销]公司可以采取预防措施来防止[主权]抵押被否认。”——托马斯·巴林，1865