The presence of Blockchain Technology (BCT) and its potential supply chain (SC) and logistic benefits—such as improved resilience or lessened disruption—have motivated organizations to consider BCT investment. BCT is a relatively novel technology and requires multiple participants to meet its greatest potential. Its novelty is a barrier to its adoption and can be dependent on an innovator or leader to convince others to invest in or adopt BCT. Using an institutional entrepreneurship theoretical lens, we determine who should lead the investment (adoption) or whether a collaborative investment is best. Insights into this context can be garnered using a sequential game-theoretic model where lead investment roles switch amongst parties. Four scenarios are evaluated and consider full, partial, or no collaboration between SC entities. Within this framework, the two-stage process of adopting and implementing BCT is introduced to separate cost and demand channels. During the adoption stage, a reduction in marginal production cost via positive net benefits of BCT-based transportation and logistics is considered in the cost channel. In the implementation stage, the optimal level of BCT investment is determined, increasing shipping quality for consumers in transportation and logistics and reducing supply chain disruption simultaneously, which is considered in the demand channel. The results show that greater disruption likelihood will boost retail prices, intermediate prices, and profits of SC entities after BCT is adopted. We also find that traditional SCs with higher disruption levels result in lower BCT investment. When a leader in the sequential game (the manufacturer in our model) is the institutional entrepreneur, collaboration in BCT investment becomes more attractive. One important—and counterintuitive—result reveals that when full SC cooperation doesn’t exist, the entire SC is better off when the follower (not the leader) in a sequential game leads BCT adoption. The unique role of reduction in transportation and logistics costs via the cost channel is to compensate for a lower BCT investment due to lack of competition or reinforce a higher BCT investment by counterbalancing opportunistic behaviors.

中文翻译：

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从制度创业理论的角度评估多层供应链中区块链技术的采用

区块链技术 (BCT) 的存在及其潜在的供应链 (SC) 和物流效益（例如提高弹性或减少中断）促使组织考虑 BCT 投资。BCT 是一项相对较新的技术，需要多个参与者才能发挥其最大潜力。它的新颖性是其采用的障碍，并且可能依赖于创新者或领导者说服其他人投资或采用 BCT。使用机构创业理论视角，我们确定谁应该领导投资（采用）或合作投资是否最好。可以使用顺序博弈论模型来深入了解这一背景，其中主导投资角色在各方之间切换。评估了四种场景，并考虑 SC 实体之间的完全协作、部分协作或无协作。在此框架内，引入了采用和实施 BCT 的两阶段过程，以分离成本和需求渠道。在采用阶段，成本渠道中考虑了通过基于 BCT 的运输和物流的正净利润来降低边际生产成本。在实施阶段，确定BCT投资的最佳水平，在提高运输和物流消费者的运输质量的同时，减少供应链中断，这是在需求渠道中考虑的。结果表明，采用 BCT 后，更大的中断可能性将提高 SC 实体的零售价格、中间价格和利润。我们还发现，破坏水平较高的传统 SC 会导致 BCT 投资较低。当顺序博弈的领导者（我们模型中的制造商）是机构企业家时，BCT 投资中的合作就变得更具吸引力。一个重要且违反直觉的结果表明，当不存在全面的 SC 合作时，当连续游戏中的追随者（而不是领导者）领先 BCT 的采用时，整个 SC 的状况会更好。通过成本渠道降低运输和物流成本的独特作用是补偿由于缺乏竞争而降低的BCT投资，或者通过抵消机会主义行为来强化更高的BCT投资。