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Harmfulness and Wrongfulness in Sex-by-Deception
Criminal Law and Philosophy ( IF 0.7 ) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09714-3
Rachel C. Tolley

In Criminalizing Sex, Stuart Green wisely eschews any attempt to fully analyse the problem of ‘sex-by-deception’ in a single chapter, instead offering a ‘basic framework’ for determining whether an expansion of the law of ‘rape by deceit’ might be justified. In this article, I offer a revision to that framework. Green begins from an account of rape centred on the right to (negative) sexual autonomy and seeks to reject an expansionist account under which any deceptions and mistakes could vitiate consent to sexual activity. Sharing these starting points, I argue, pace Green, that variations in the harmfulness and wrongfulness of different deceptions cannot ground content-based restrictions on consent-vitiating deceptions. I argue that whilst different kinds of deceptive practices might wrong V to a greater or lesser extent, these variations lead to content-neutral, form-based restrictions on consent-vitiating deceptions. Moreover, whilst variations in the harms of D’s conduct are unlikely to ground a coherent set of content-sensitive restrictions on consent-vitiating deceptions, the harms of criminalisation differ depending on the content of the deception in question and this might lead to content-based restrictions on liability. However, an analysis of the variable costs of criminalisation is not obviously connected to the moral concept of consent-validity. Accordingly, whilst I suspect that both form and content-based restrictions on consent-vitiating deceptions are warranted in this area, the justification for the latter is unlikely to lie within an analysis of consent-validity itself, or the varied harmfulness and wrongfulness of D’s own conduct.



中文翻译:

性欺骗的危害性和不法性

《性犯罪定罪》一书中,斯图尔特·格林明智地避免了在单一章节中全面分析“欺骗性行为”问题的任何尝试,而是提供了一个“基本框架”来确定扩大“欺骗性强奸”法律是否可能有理有据。在本文中,我对该框架进行了修订。格林从以(消极)性自主权为中心的强奸叙述开始,并试图拒绝一种扩张主义的叙述,在这种叙述中,任何欺骗和错误都可能使对性活动的同意无效。格林表示,在分享这些出发点时,我认为不同欺骗行为的危害性和不法性的差异不能作为对破坏同意的欺骗行为的基于内容的限制。我认为,虽然不同类型的欺骗行为可能或多或少地对 V 造成错误,但这些变化会导致内容中立、基于形式的对破坏同意的欺骗行为的限制。此外,虽然 D 行为的危害的不同不太可能对无效同意的欺骗行为建立一套连贯的内容敏感限制,但刑事定罪的危害根据相关欺骗的内容而有所不同,这可能会导致基于内容的欺骗行为。责任限制。然而,对刑事定罪的可变成本的分析与同意有效性的道德概念并没有明显的联系。因此,虽然我怀疑在这一领域对损害同意的欺骗行为进行基于形式和内容的限制是有道理的,但后者的理由不太可能在于对同意有效性本身的分析,或 D 的各种有害性和不法性的分析。自己的行为。

更新日期:2024-02-07
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