Most literature on the antecedents of misreporting in the public sector focuses on the propensity to report financial breakeven, with limited attention to the regulatory and normative incentives that may alter such propensity. This study provides novel explanations for public sector organisations' deviation from breakeven. Its underlying assumption is that misreporting may be shaped by mimetic pressures encouraging conformity as well as regulatory pressures conveyed through soft budget constraints. The empirical analysis includes all Italian public healthcare organisations over 17 years. The findings suggest that public healthcare organisations may manipulate accruals not only to achieve financial breakeven, but also to conform with peers’ financial performance or to worsen reported financial performance in anticipation of a bailout.

大多数关于公共部门误报前因的文献都集中于报告财务盈亏平衡的倾向，而对可能改变这种倾向的监管和规范激励措施的关注有限。这项研究为公共部门组织偏离盈亏平衡提供了新颖的解释。其基本假设是，误报可能是由鼓励一致性的模仿压力以及通过软预算约束传达的监管压力造成的。实证分析涵盖 17 年以上的所有意大利公共医疗保健组织。研究结果表明，公共医疗机构可​​能会操纵应计费用，不仅是为了实现财务收支平衡，而且是为了与同行的财务业绩保持一致，或者在预期救助的情况下恶化报告的财务业绩。