People have a more-nuanced view of misinformation than the binary distinction between “fake news” and “real news” implies. We distinguish between the truth of a statement's (i.e., the specific, literal information) and its (i.e., the general, overarching meaning), and suggest that people tolerate and intentionally spread misinformation in part because they believe its gist. That is, even when they recognize a claim as literally false, they may judge it as morally acceptable to spread because they believe it is true “in spirit.” Prior knowledge, partisanship, and imagination increase belief in the gist. We argue that partisan conflict about the morality of spreading misinformation hinges on disagreements not only about facts but also about gists.

中文翻译：

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“这不是字面意思，但你明白了要点：”对真相的微妙理解如何鼓励人们纵容和传播错误信息


人们对错误信息的看法比“假新闻”和“真实新闻”之间的二元区别更加微妙。我们区分陈述的真实性（即具体的字面信息）和它的真实性（即一般的总体意义），并建议人们容忍并故意传播错误信息，部分原因是他们相信其要点。也就是说，即使他们承认某个主张实际上是错误的，他们也可能认为它在道德上可以接受传播，因为他们相信它“在精神上”是真实的。先验知识、党派偏见和想象力增强了人们对要点的信念。我们认为，关于传播错误信息的道德的党派冲突不仅取决于对事实的分歧，还取决于对要点的分歧。