Standard labor market models assume that workers hold accurate beliefs about the external wage distribution, and hence their outside options with other employers. We test this assumption by comparing German workers’ beliefs about outside options with objective benchmarks. First, we find that workers wrongly anchor their beliefs about outside options on their current wage: workers that would experience a 10% wage change if switching to their outside option only expect a 1% change. Second, workers in low-paying firms underestimate wages elsewhere. Third, in response to information about the wages of similar workers, respondents correct their beliefs about their outside options and change their job search and wage negotiation intentions. Finally, we analyze the consequences of anchoring in a simple equilibrium model. In the model, anchored beliefs keep overly pessimistic workers stuck in low-wage jobs, which gives rise to monopsony power and labor market segmentation.

中文翻译：

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工人对外部选择的看法

标准劳动力市场模型假设工人对外部工资分配以及他们与其他雇主的外部选择持有准确的信念。我们通过将德国工人对外部选择的信念与客观基准进行比较来检验这一假设。首先，我们发现工人错误地将他们对外部选择的信念锚定在他们当前的工资上：如果转向外部选择，工人的工资只会发生 1% 的变化。其次，低薪企业的工人低估了其他地方的工资。第三，针对类似工人的工资信息，受访者纠正了他们对外部选择的看法，改变了他们的求职和工资谈判意图。最后，我们分析了简单均衡模型中锚定的后果。在该模型中，锚​​定信念使过度悲观的工人陷入低工资工作，从而导致垄断权力和劳动力市场分割。