Despite interest in preindustrial markets, archaeological discussions have largely been limited to proposing methods to determine the presence or absence of market exchange in ancient societies. While these contributions are important, methodological limitations have prevented theoretical considerations of the emergence and evolution of marketplaces and market exchange in prehistory. We propose that agent-based modeling provides a window to explore physical conditions and agent behaviors that facilitate the emergence of customary exchange locations and how such locations may evolve into socially embedded institutions. The model we designed suggests that simple bartering rules among agents can generate concentrated locations of exchange and that spatial heterogeneity of resources is the most important factor in facilitating the emergence of such locales. Furthermore, partner-search behaviors and exchange of information play a key role in the institutionalization of the marketplace. The results of our simulation suggest that marketplaces can develop, even with the absence of formalized currency or central planning, as a consequence of collective strategies taken up by agents to reduce exchange partner-search costs and make transactions more frequent and predictable. The model also suggests that, once established as a social institution, marketplaces may become highly conservative and resistant to change. As such, it is inferred that bottom-up and/or top-down interventions may have often been required to establish new marketplaces or relocate marketplaces to incorporate new resources, resolve supply–demand imbalances, or minimize rising economic costs that arise as a result of social, political, and economic change.

尽管人们对前工业化市场感兴趣，但考古学讨论在很大程度上仅限于提出确定古代社会是否存在市场交换的方法。虽然这些贡献很重要，但方法论的局限性阻碍了对史前市场和市场交换的出现和演变的理论思考。我们建议基于主体的建模提供了一个窗口来探索促进习惯交换地点的出现的物理条件和主体行为以及这些地点如何演变为社会嵌入机构。我们设计的模型表明，主体之间简单的易货规则可以产生集中的交换地点，而资源的空间异质性是促进此类地点出现的最重要因素。此外，合作伙伴搜索行为和信息交换在市场制度化中发挥着关键作用。我们的模拟结果表明，即使没有正式的货币或中央计划，市场也可以发展，这是代理商采取集体策略来降低交换合作伙伴搜索成本并使交易更加频繁和可预测的结果。该模型还表明，一旦建立为社会机构，市场可能会变得高度保守并抵制变革。因此，据推测，可能经常需要自下而上和/或自上而下的干预措施来建立新的市场或重新定位市场以吸收新的资源，解决供需失衡，或最大限度地减少由此产生的不断上升的经济成本社会、政治和经济变革。