This paper presents evidence that firms had labor market power during the early 1930s. Using plant-level data from the Census of Manufactures between 1929 and 1935, I construct a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of local labor market concentration at the State-Economic-Area-by-industry-by-occupation level. I find that local labor market concentration has a negative relationship with wages which is consistent with labor market monopsony power. The results are robust to excluding local labor markets with one firm, excluding industries with local product markets, as well as the inclusion of industry characteristic, SEA, and occupational time trends. I find evidence that New Deal minimum wage policies weakened monopsony power. I also find suggestive evidence that high unemployment rates during 1930 reduced workers’ bargaining power.

中文翻译：

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美国的垄断权：来自大萧条的证据

本文提出的证据表明，企业在 20 世纪 30 年代初期拥有劳动力市场力量。利用 1929 年至 1935 年间制造业普查的工厂级数据，我构建了州经济区、行业、职业层面的当地劳动力市场集中度赫芬达尔-赫希曼指数。我发现当地劳动力市场集中度与工资呈负相关，这与劳动力市场垄断力量是一致的。排除具有一家公司的本地劳动力市场、排除具有本地产品市场的行业以及包含行业特征、SEA 和职业时间趋势后，结果是稳健的。我发现有证据表明新政最低工资政策削弱了垄断势力。我还发现有启发性的证据表明 1930 年的高失业率降低了工人的议价能力。