Using U.S. EPA pollution data, we analyze which governance provisions are related to firm pollution. We find that classified boards, poison pills, limits to amend bylaws, and fair price amendments are associated with significantly greater pollution. In contrast, cumulative voting, because it allows a greater voice for minority shareholders, is associated with lower pollution. We create a pollution-based index (the P-index) based on the sum of those governance provisions positively related to pollution plus an indicator for lack of cumulative voting. The P-index has approximately twice as large an association with firm-level pollution as the E-index. Most measures of board structure or compensation have no significant relation with pollution after controlling for the P-index. An instrumental variable analysis suggests a causal relation between the P-index and pollution.

使用美国环保署的污染数据，我们分析了哪些治理条款与企业污染相关。我们发现分类委员会、毒丸计划、修改章程的限制和公平价格修改与显着更大的污染有关。相比之下，累积投票制可以让少数股东有更大的发言权，因此可以降低污染。我们根据与污染正相关的治理规定的总和加上缺乏累积投票的指标，创建了一个基于污染的指数（P 指数）。P 指数与企业层面污染的关联度大约是 E 指数的两倍。在控制 P 指数后，大多数董事会结构或薪酬措施与污染没有显着关系。工具变量分析表明 P 指数与污染之间存在因果关系。