Intense debate surrounds the effects of trade on voting, yet less attention has been paid to how fluctuations in the real exchange rate may influence elections. A moderately overvalued currency enhances consumers’ purchasing power, yet extreme overvaluation threatens exports and economic growth. We therefore expect exchange rates to have a conditional effect on elections: when a currency is undervalued, voters will punish incumbents for further depreciations; yet when it is highly overvalued, they may reward incumbents for depreciation. We empirically explore our argument in three steps. First, we examine up to 412 elections in up to 59 democratic countries and show that voters generally punish depreciation in the real exchange rate when the currency is undervalued. We also find that at extremely high levels of currency overvaluation, voters sometimes reward incumbents for depreciation. A currency peg, especially in the eurozone, appears to insulate incumbents from these effects. In a second step, we explore the microfoundations of the election results through survey experiments in three advanced industrialized and two emerging market nations with different monetary and exchange rate policies and institutions. Respondents in countries with undervalued to mildly overvalued currencies disapprove of currency depreciations, whereas those facing a very highly overvalued currency favor depreciation. Third, we examine the mechanism of political competition in exchange rate policymaking and demonstrate that sustained undervaluation is rare in countries with strong political competition. Democratic governments have electoral incentives to avoid using undervalued currencies as a means of shielding workers from import competition.

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汇率会影响投票吗？来自民主国家选举和调查实验的证据

围绕贸易对投票的影响存在激烈的争论，但很少有人关注贸易如何影响投票。实际汇率波动可能会影响选举。货币适度高估会增强消费者的购买力，但极度高估会威胁出口和经济增长。因此，我们预计汇率会对选举产生有条件的影响：当一种货币被低估时，选民会惩罚现有货币进一步贬值；然而，当它被高度高估时，他们可能会因贬值而奖励现任者。我们分三步实证探讨我们的论点。首先，我们研究了多达 59 个民主国家的 412 次选举，结果表明，当货币被低估时，选民通常会惩罚实际汇率贬值。我们还发现，在货币高估程度极高的情况下，选民有时会奖励现有货币贬值。货币挂钩，尤其是欧元区的货币挂钩，似乎可以使现有国家免受这些影响。第二步，我们通过对三个先进工业化国家和两个具有不同货币和汇率政策和制度的新兴市场国家的调查实验来探索选举结果的微观基础。货币被低估至轻度高估的国家的受访者不赞成货币贬值，而货币被严重高估的国家的受访者则支持贬值。第三，我们考察了汇率政策制定中的政治竞争机制，并证明在政治竞争激烈的国家，汇率持续低估的情况很少见。民主政府有选举激励措施，以避免使用低估的货币作为保护工人免受进口竞争的手段。