We study how misbehavior in a multinational’s value network, not only in subsidiaries but also in suppliers, affects its corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Combining the network perspective of multinationals with the risk management view of CSR, we argue that major misbehavior in subsidiaries and independent suppliers leads to CSR performance improvements. The reason is that in response to the misbehavior, the multinational not only addresses the specific problem with the misbehaving party but also refines network-wide practices to rebuild its reputation and social contract with stakeholders, leading to better CSR performance. Additionally, we argue that home-country CSR mandates enhance this relationship. The reason is that the regulatory mandates heighten the multinational’s sensitivity to the costs of value network partners’ misbehavior, strengthening its response. Analyses of 1262 multinationals from 35 home countries in 2008–2018 support these ideas. They also reveal that while major subsidiary misbehavior leads to higher internal CSR performance, major supplier misbehavior results in higher external CSR performance. These ideas and findings introduce and highlight how managers can use CSR as an ex-post strategic tool for addressing reputational damage caused by misbehavior in their global value networks, complementing the use of CSR as a source of competitive advantage.

我们研究跨国公司价值网络中的不当行为（不仅包括子公司，还包括供应商）如何影响其企业社会责任 (CSR) 绩效。结合跨国公司的网络视角和企业社会责任的风险管理视角，我们认为子公司和独立供应商的重大不当行为会导致企业社会责任绩效的提高。原因在于，针对不当行为，跨国公司不仅要解决不当行为方的具体问题，还要完善网络范围内的做法，以重建其与利益相关者的声誉和社会契约，从而获得更好的企业社会责任绩效。此外，我们认为母国的企业社会责任指令可以增强这种关系。原因是监管要求提高了跨国公司对价值网络合作伙伴不当行为成本的敏感性，从而加强了其应对措施。 2008 年至 2018 年对来自 35 个国家的 1262 家跨国公司的分析支持了这些观点。他们还透露，虽然主要子公司的不当行为会导致更高的内部企业社会责任绩效，但主要供应商的不当行为会导致更高的外部企业社会责任绩效。这些想法和研究结果介绍并强调了管理者如何使用企业社会责任作为事后战略工具来解决全球价值网络中不当行为造成的声誉损害，从而补充使用企业社会责任作为竞争优势的来源。