Although consistency has long been positioned as a cornerstone of trust, the present paper examines when and why consistent rule-following undermines versus enhances trust. Across six preregistered experiments (total N = 2649), we study trust in decision-makers (e.g., police officers, managers) who either consistently punish offenders according to codified rules (e.g., laws, policies) or who exercise discretion by occasionally deviating from rules. We find that people are more likely to trust decision-makers that exercise discretion rather than consistently follow rules, to the extent that discretion signals benevolence. The degree to which discretion is perceived as benevolent, and therefore trustworthy, depends on what type of discretion is exercised, how the decision is reached, to whom discretion is applied, and the nature of the transgressions being punished. Specifically, people reward decision-makers who use discretion leniently (rather than punitively) and apply it thoughtfully (rather than arbitrarily). Moreover, only certain cases of punishment are deemed appropriate for discretion. When discretion is perceived to be motivated by favoritism because it is applied to close others, or when the basis for discretion is unclear because there is little variance in cases of the crime being punished, discretion fails to signal benevolence and elicit trust. This research has important implications for understanding trust, discretion, and the reputational consequences of punishment.

尽管一致性长期以来一直被视为信任的基石，但本文探讨了一致遵守规则何时以及为何会破坏或增强信任。在六个预先注册的实验（总共N  = 2649）中，我们研究了对决策者（例如警察、管理人员）的信任，他们要么根据成文规则（例如法律、政策）一贯惩罚犯罪者，要么偶尔偏离规则来行使自由裁量权。规则。我们发现，人们更有可能信任那些行使自由裁量权的决策者，而不是始终遵守规则的决策者，因为自由裁量权意味着仁慈。自由裁量权在多大程度上被视为仁慈并因此值得信赖，取决于行使何种类型的自由裁量权、如何做出决定、适用自由裁量权的对象以及受到惩罚的违法行为的性质。具体来说，人们会奖励那些宽松地（而不是惩罚性地）使用自由裁量权并深思熟虑（而不是任意地）运用自由裁量权的决策者。此外，只有某些惩罚情况才被认为适合酌情处理。当自由裁量权被认为是出于偏袒的动机，因为它适用于亲密的他人，或者当自由裁量权的基础不明确，因为受到惩罚的犯罪案件几乎没有差异，自由裁量权就无法体现仁慈并赢得信任。这项研究对于理解信任、自由裁量权以及惩罚的声誉后果具有重要意义。