In the U.S., multihospital systems (MHSs) charge significantly higher prices for hospital services than stand-alone hospitals. Rivalry restraint theory suggests that MHS with multimarket contact (MMC) can tacitly collude and mutually forebear from price competition to keep their prices above competitive levels. We posit that the success of such MMC-induced rivalry restraints (the truce) is affected by two conflicting roles of IT at the corporate level and market unit levels, respectively. The corporate parent seeks to standardize IT applications enterprise-wide to coordinate market units as a means of jointly implementing the rivalry restraint strategy and keeping prices high enterprise-wide. However, market units, i.e., the member hospitals of MHS clustered in geographic patient markets, face competitive pressures to reduce their service costs. Market units seek to use differentiated IT applications to achieve cost reductions, which then fuel price competition in local markets, jeopardize the sustainability of the truce, and weaken the enterprise-wide price effects of the corporate parent’s rivalry restraint strategy. In a longitudinal study of 195 multihospital systems in the U.S. in the 2005-2013 time period, we found support for these ideas. The corporate-wide standardization of the operational IT of MHS complements the rivalry restraint strategy to increase enterprise-wide prices. Market units’ use of differentiated analytical IT reduces costs in local markets and weakens the price effects of the rivalry restraint strategy. The study advances IS research and practice by theorizing how the corporate-level and the market unit-level IT of a multi-unit, multimarket (MUMM) organization can have opposing moderating effects on the link between MMC and the average prices charged by the MUMM organization.

中文翻译：

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IT 是否会导致共谋或竞争：检查 IT 对多市场多医院系统中服务定价的影响

在美国，多医院系统 (MHS) 收取的医院服务价格明显高于独立医院。竞争抑制理论表明，具有多市场联系（MMC）的 MHS 可以默契地串通并相互抑制价格竞争，以保持其价格高于竞争水平。我们假设这种 MMC 引发的竞争限制（休战）的成功分别受到 IT 在公司层面和市场单位层面两个相互冲突的角色的影响。母公司寻求在整个企业范围内标准化IT应用程序，以协调市场单位，以此作为共同实施竞争抑制战略并在整个企业范围内保持高价格的手段。然而，市场单位，即聚集在地理患者市场的 MHS 成员医院，面临着降低服务成本的竞争压力。市场单位寻求使用差异化的IT应用来降低成本，这会加剧当地市场的价格竞争，危及休战的可持续性，并削弱母公司竞争抑制策略对企业范围内的价格影响。在对 2005 年至 2013 年期间美国 195 个多医院系统进行的纵向研究中，我们发现了对这些想法的支持。MHS 运营 IT 的全公司标准化补充了竞争抑制策略，以提高全公司的价格。市场单位对差异化分析IT的使用降低了当地市场的成本并削弱了竞争抑制策略的价格效应。该研究通过理论化多单位、多市场 (MUMM) 组织的公司级和市场单位级 IT 如何对 MMC 与 MUMM 收取的平​​均价格之间的联系产生相反的调节作用，推进了 IS 研究和实践组织。