This study presents a model in which behavioral investors shape their current expectations based on statistical analysis of historical non-disclosure events. Investors may hold overly optimistic expectations following a non-disclosure event, thereby disrupting unraveling toward forthcoming disclosures. While a regulator can mandate disclosure, this protective intervention has its drawbacks. Overprotection prevents investors from learning from losses and leads to cycles of high compliance followed by high mispricing when innovations in transactions render current regulations ineffective. An unregulated market, on the other hand, tends toward high transparency over time. The model further explains negative market reactions to regulation, an association between price drift and transparency, reversals in market confidence, and that regulators should favor laissez-faire in times of investor pessimism. Further implications are explored for regulations that facilitate learning and prevent cycles.

中文翻译：

---

披露家长作风

本研究提出了一个模型，行为投资者根据历史未披露事件的统计分析来塑造他们当前的预期。在未披露事件之后，投资者可能会抱有过于乐观的预期，从而扰乱即将披露的信息。虽然监管机构可以强制披露，但这种保护性干预措施也有其缺点。过度保护会阻碍投资者从损失中吸取教训，并导致高度合规性的循环，随后当交易创新导致当前监管失效时，就会出现高度错误定价。另一方面，不受监管的市场随着时间的推移往往会变得高度透明。该模型进一步解释了市场对监管的负面反应、价格漂移与透明度之间的关联、市场信心的逆转，以及监管机构在投资者悲观时期应支持自由放任。进一步探讨了促进学习和防止循环的法规的影响。