I criticize the widely-defended view that the quantum measurement problem is an example of underdetermination of theory by evidence: more specifically, the view that the unmodified, unitary quantum formalism (interpreted following Everett) is empirically indistinguishable from Bohmian Mechanics and from dynamical-collapse theories like the GRW or CSL theories. I argue that there as yet no empirically successful generalization of either theory to interacting quantum field theory and so the apparent underdetermination is broken by a very large class of quantum experiments that require field theory somewhere in their description. The class of quantum experiments reproducible by either is much smaller than is commonly recognized and excludes many of the most iconic successes of quantum mechanics, including the quantitative account of Rayleigh scattering that explains the color of the sky. I respond to various arguments to the contrary in the recent literature.

我批评了一种广受拥护的观点，即量子测量问题是证据不足决定理论的一个例子：更具体地说，这种观点认为，未经修改的统一量子形式主义（按照埃弗里特的解释）在经验上与波姆力学和动力学崩溃没有区别。 GRW 或 CSL 理论等理论。我认为，这两种理论还没有在经验上成功地推广到相互作用的量子场论，因此明显的不确定性被一大类量子实验所打破，这些实验在其描述中的某个地方需要场论。两者均可重现的量子实验类别比人们普遍认识的要小得多，并且排除了量子力学中许多最具标志性的成功，包括解释天空颜色的瑞利散射的定量解释。我对最近文献中的各种相反的论点做出了回应。