Modes of presentation (MOPs) are often said to have to be transparent, usually in the sense that thinkers can know solely via introspection whether or not they are deploying the same one. While there has been much discussion of threats to transparency stemming from externalism, another threat to transparency has garnered less attention. This novel threat arises if MOPs are robust, as I argue they should be according to internalist views of MOPs which identify them with representational vehicles, such as mental files. I explain how identifying MOPs with vehicles/files threatens transparency, provide empirical illustrations, and critically examine some attempts to dispel the threat. Rather than abandoning transparency, I outline a way of reconciling it with a robust view of mental files which takes seriously the idea that they are targets for investigation in cognitive science. Transparency does not require introspective access, and rather than as an incontrovertible principle for individuating MOPs, we can view it more modestly, as an open empirical hypothesis.

中文翻译：

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心理车辆的透明度

人们常说呈现模式（MOP）必须是透明的，通常是指思想家仅通过内省就可以知道他们是否在使用相同的呈现模式。尽管人们对外部主义对透明度的威胁进行了很多讨论，但对透明度的另一种威胁却很少受到关注。如果 MOP 很强大，就会出现这种新的威胁，因为我认为它们应该符合 MOP 的内在主义观点，这种观点将它们与代表性载体（例如心理档案）识别在一起。我解释了用车辆/文件识别 MOP 如何威胁透明度，提供实证说明，并批判性地审查一些消除威胁的尝试。我没有放弃透明度，而是概述了一种将其与心理档案的强大观点相协调的方法，该观点认真对待它们是认知科学研究的目标这一想法。透明度不需要内省，我们可以更谦虚地将其视为一个开放的经验假设，而不是作为个体化 MOP 的无可争议的原则。