In Dark Matters, Mara Van Der Lugt attempts to rehabilitate pessimism as a moral stance. Critical to this task is the distinction between what she calls “future-oriented” and “value-oriented” pessimism (10). The former is what most people presently understand the word pessimism to mean: a gloomy view about the future, an attitude of premature defeat.Although this kind of fatalism can be found alongside value-oriented pessimism, Van Der Lugt is chiefly interested in the latter, which she portrays as a sympathetic appreciation of suffering that, although not without hope, does not attempt to explain—let alone explain away—the existence of evil.To make this case, Dark Matters proceeds in three sections. The first section, comprising the introduction and first two chapters of the book, sets up the contrast between future- and value-oriented pessimism by examining various approaches to the classic problem of evil, as summarized by Epicurus’s classic trilemma among God’s power, God’s goodness, and the existence of evil.Some of these are what she calls “negative” strategies, which deny the premise that there is evil—or, more generously, a problematic amount of evil—in the world (33). And some are “positive” strategies, which accept the premise of evil in the world but attempt to explain the origin of evil by, for example, casting it as the inevitable side effect of free will and/or sin (35). Whatever their views about the future, those who take up these strategies are, in Van Der Lugt’s terms, “optimists.” And they are so by virtue of believing the problem of evil can be satisfactorily answered.On the other hand, those who take the contrasting approach, believing that the problem of evil is so acute that it cannot be rationally resolved, are pessimists. And first among them, for Van Der Lugt’s purposes, is Pierre Bayle, who set the terms of the pessimist/optimist debate in the early modern era by making the problem of evil primarily a problem of suffering.For Bayle, the primary task of addressing Epicurus’s query is not to justify or undermine belief in the existence of a good God. It is, rather, to understand, or at least appreciate, the irrefutable experience of human suffering. This focus on suffering alone does not make Bayle a pessimist. Rather, what makes him a pessimist is his insistence that there is far more suffering than pleasure in life, that we have little power to choose whether we suffer or flourish in any given circumstance, and that most of our pains cannot be explained as just punishment.In opposing Bayle’s diagnosis, Van Der Lugt suggests that most optimists employ a rhetorical strategy that she calls “the optics of optimism.” This strategy first attempts to meet Bayle head-on by denying his first two assertions. That is, optimists hold that there is far more joy in life than suffering and that we have significant capacity to choose happiness over sorrow. In this dispute, disagreement centers around a thought experiment proposed by Bayle: if you ask those advanced in years whether or not they would willingly pass through their lives again, with the same ration of good and evil, most will answer negatively. Optimists, such as William King and Leibniz, disagree. As they see it, most people would readily agree to live their lives again, if the alternative was oblivion.The problem for the optimists here is not that their answer is implausible. Indeed, they seem to be correct about the general opinion of humanity. It is, rather, that it is insufficient for their purposes. For although Bayle may indeed be wrong that most people would choose oblivion over a second pass through life, the existence of even one creature who would reasonably choose oblivion is enough to trouble those who assert the existence of a good universal order. This is where the optics of optimism come in. For, when confronted with the likely existence of even one miserable wretch, the optimists shift their arguments from the “creaturely” to the “cosmic” perspective (71). The world, they concede, is not unblemished by miserable wretches, but their suffering is either necessary for the overall good order or more than adequately rewarded in the next life.At this point, according to Van Der Lugt, the structure of the debate about the problem of evil in the early modern era is set. The pessimists, following Bayle, find the optimists’ attempts at rational theodicy cruelly dismissive of actually experienced suffering. At the same time, the optimists believe the pessimists overstate their case and consequently cause unnecessary suffering by promoting a gloomy view of existence. As Van Der Lugt notes, both of these positions are deeply ethical; they both care about the practical effects of philosophical and theological attempts to address the problem of evil. And in the second section of Dark Matters she takes us on a “Grand Tour” through the ways this debate played out during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (105).This section of the book, like any grand tour, is necessarily selective. Major stops include Voltaire (chapter 3), La Mettrie and Maupertuis (chapter 4), Hume (chapter 5), Rousseau (chapter 6), Kant (chapter 7), and Schopenhauer (chapter 8). As the subtle interplay among these figures resists easy summary, I will not attempt a synopsis here but rather make two general comments. First, in this section of the book, Van Der Lugt skillfully demonstrates the contributions of these figures without becoming distracted by thorny interpretive issues. And second, the overall impression given by this long section of Dark Matters is that the “debate” between pessimists and optimists in the early modern period is less a debate than a collaboration. Certainly Maupertuis disagreed with La Mettrie, Hume with the Stoics, Rousseau with Voltaire, Kant and Schopenhauer with everyone. But these disagreements were the effect of a deeper agreement about the importance of offering hope and consolation to those who suffer. The true problem of evil that emerges from these chapters is that philosophy is insufficient to the task. Perhaps we can rationally explain the origin of evil; perhaps we can justify the existence of all suffering as deserved or necessary. But even if the optimists are correct, theodicy does little to address the lived experience of suffering and sorrow. Rational inquiry is, therefore, not the end but the beginning of an answer the problem of evil. It can show us where sympathy, consolation, and hope are necessary, but it cannot provide them on its own.This concern with the ethical import of the problem of evil and the use and limitations of philosophy in the face of suffering also informs the last section, and chapter, of Dark Matters. Subtitled “Pessimism as a Moral Source,” this chapter aims to apply the lessons of the foregoing to the present (395). According to Van Der Lugt, this task is urgent for two reasons. First, Van Der Lugt is wary of the contemporary gospel of self-actualization. There is a dark side to being told that you can be anything if you just work hard enough: “If we’re not happy, we are doing something wrong” (402). Second, in addition to the ubiquity of debased aphoristic Stoicism, Van Der Lugt worries that our increasing exposure to depictions of suffering, as supplied by the internet and mass media, depletes our capacity for sympathy. There is an obvious moral difference between torturing someone to death and fictionally depicting the act of torturing someone to death. But it seems likely, Van Der Lugt proposes, that from the perspective of the spectator, the deleterious effects of watching these depictions for entertainment is similar.Thus, according to Van Der Lugt, we find in the Baylean tradition of pessimism and the debate that followed not only an overlooked and fascinating philosophical tradition but also a necessary corrective. For pessimism at its best is not a prediction that things will turn out ill. It is, rather, a reminder of the fragility of life, and the importance of sympathy, consolation, and hope.As an intellectual history, Dark Matters is superb. Throughout, Van Der Lugt traces the tradition of pessimism during the early modern period with clarity, energy, and subtlety. Subject experts on the philosophers profiled may complain that Van Der Lugt rarely gives her opinion regarding contested interpretations, but Van Der Lugt is relentlessly unconcerned with these issues. The story of Dark Matters is the story of pessimism and optimism after Bayle, and so it is of little importance, for instance, whether Kant ultimately decided that theodicy is or is not impossible. Similarly, some may complain that important figures have been left out of the narrative. Yet, as Van Der Lugt notes, the intellectual history contained in Dark Matters is not intended to be exhaustive (396). The point of the work is to rehabilitate pessimism as a moral stance, not to comprehensively document every position that could be called pessimistic or optimistic.Finally, some may find her willingness to drop the facade of philosophical distance in the last chapter unseemly. Is certainly unconventional, but this reader appreciated her willingness to take the risk. Further, the practical turn is justified by the preceding argument. To treat value-oriented pessimism as a mere mental exercise would betray the very tradition Dark Matters wishes to revive.Thus, with respect to the focus, selectivity, and practical orientation of the book, Van Der Lugt’s decisions are all justifiable. Yet they come at a cost, as well. For my part, the most troublesome was the first, which seemed to occasionally rob the reader of informed insight. For instance, near the end of her chapter on Schopenhauer, Van Der Lugt writes, “Whether [Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide] works is another question: my point is merely that the structure of Schopenhauer’s response seems to get something right” (383). It is understandable that Van Der Lugt would not want to weigh in here and broach inessential subjects. Yet having come so far with so competent a guide, both here and at other points, I could not help but be disappointed she did not venture an opinion.Stylistically, the book is not only well written but is leavened with humor and humanity. Given the subject matter, these attributes are both helpful and necessary. In the hands of a lesser author, discussions of, for example, philosophical justifications for suicide could be oppressive, not to mention dangerous. Yet Van Der Lugt manages them with care and compassion, without sacrificing philosophical rigor. In sum, Dark Matters is a major contribution to the understanding the oft-overlooked tradition of value-oriented pessimism. Whether it will ultimately spur further interest in this tradition, or the way this tradition is manifested in the philosophers profiled, one cannot say. As Van Der Lugt notes, philosophical fashion is unpredictable (105). Yet it is surely an informative and, surprisingly, enjoyable work, one that throws considerable light on the shadow side of human existence.

中文翻译：

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暗物质：悲观主义和苦难问题

在《黑暗物质》中，玛拉·范德鲁格特试图恢复悲观主义作为一种道德立场。这项任务的关键是她所说的“面向未来”和“面向价值”的悲观主义之间的区别（10）。前者是大多数人目前对悲观主义一词的理解：对未来的悲观看法，过早失败的态度。虽然这种宿命论可以与价值导向的悲观主义并存，但范德鲁格特主要对后者感兴趣她将其描述为对苦难的同情欣赏，虽然并非没有希望，但并不试图解释——更不用说解释消除——邪恶的存在。为了说明这一点，《黑暗物质》分为三个部分。第一部分由引言和本书的前两章组成，通过考察解决经典邪恶问题的各种方法，建立了面向未来的悲观主义和面向价值的悲观主义之间的对比，正如伊壁鸠鲁在上帝的力量、上帝的良善之间的经典三难困境所总结的那样。其中一些是她所说的“消极”策略，这些策略否认世界上存在邪恶——或者更慷慨地说，存在有问题的邪恶数量——的前提（33）。有些是“积极”策略，它们接受世界上有邪恶的前提，但试图通过例如将其视为自由意志和/或罪恶不可避免的副作用来解释邪恶的起源（35）。无论他们对未来有何看法，用范德鲁格特的话来说，采取这些策略的人都是“乐观主义者”。他们之所以如此，是因为相信邪恶问题可以得到令人满意的解答。另一方面，那些采取相反态度的人，认为邪恶问题如此尖锐，无法理性解决，则是悲观主义者。出于范德鲁格特的目的，其中第一个是皮埃尔·贝尔，他通过将邪恶问题主要视为痛苦问题，为近代早期的悲观主义/乐观主义辩论奠定了基础。对于贝尔来说，首要任务是解决伊壁鸠鲁的质疑并不是为了证明或削弱对善神的存在的信仰。相反，它是理解或至少欣赏人类苦难无可辩驳的经历。仅仅关注苦难并不能使贝尔成为悲观主义者。相反，使他成为悲观主义者的是他坚持认为生活中的痛苦远多于快乐，我们没有权力选择在任何特定情况下是受苦还是繁荣，而且我们的大多数痛苦不能被解释为公正的惩罚范德鲁格特反对贝尔的诊断，他认为大多数乐观主义者都采用了一种她称之为“乐观主义光学”的修辞策略。这一策略首先试图通过否认贝尔的前两个断言来正面对抗贝尔。也就是说，乐观主义者认为生活中的快乐远多于痛苦，并且我们有很大的能力选择幸福而不是悲伤。在这场纠纷中，分歧集中在贝尔提出的一个思想实验上：如果你问那些年事已高的人，他们是否愿意以同样的善恶比例重新度过一生，大多数人都会给出否定的答案。威廉·金和莱布尼茨等乐观主义者不同意这种观点。在他们看来，如果另一种选择是被遗忘，大多数人都会欣然同意重新开始自己的生活。乐观主义者的问题并不是他们的答案不可信。事实上，他们对人类普遍看法的看法似乎是正确的。相反，这不足以实现他们的目的。因为尽管贝尔认为大多数人会选择遗忘而不是第二次生命的说法可能确实是错误的，但即使是一个会合理选择遗忘的生物的存在也足以让那些断言存在良好普遍秩序的人感到困扰。这就是乐观主义的用武之地。因为，当面对甚至可能存在一个悲惨的不幸者时，乐观主义者将他们的论点从“生物”视角转向“宇宙”视角（71）。他们承认，这个世界并非没有被悲惨的不幸者所玷污，但他们的痛苦要么是整体良好秩序所必需的，要么在来世得到充分的回报。近代早期的邪恶问题已经确定。悲观主义者效仿贝尔，发现乐观主义者对理性神义论的尝试残酷地蔑视实际经历的苦难。与此同时，乐观主义者认为悲观主义者夸大了他们的观点，从而通过宣扬悲观的存在观而造成不必要的痛苦。正如范德鲁格特所指出的，这两种立场都是非常道德的。他们都关心解决邪恶问题的哲学和神学尝试的实际效果。在《暗物质》的第二部分中，她带我们进行一次“伟大的旅行”，了解这场辩论在十八世纪和十九世纪的表现方式（105）。本书的这一部分，就像任何伟大的旅行一样，必然是有选择性的。主要站点包括伏尔泰（第 3 章）、拉梅特里和莫佩尔蒂（第 4 章）、休谟（第 5 章）、卢梭（第 6 章）、康德（第 7 章）和叔本华（第 8 章）。由于这些数字之间微妙的相互作用难以简单总结，因此我不会在这里尝试进行概要，而是提出两个一般性评论。首先，在本书的这一部分中，范德鲁格特巧妙地展示了这些人物的贡献，而没有因棘手的解释问题而分心。其次，《暗物质》这一长篇章给人的总体印象是，近代早期悲观主义者和乐观主义者之间的“辩论”与其说是辩论，不如说是合作。当然，莫佩尔蒂不同意拉梅特里的观点，休谟不同意斯多葛学派的观点，卢梭不同意伏尔泰的观点，康德和叔本华不同意所有人的观点。但这些分歧是对为受苦者提供希望和安慰的重要性达成更深入共识的结果。这些章节中出现的邪恶的真正问题是哲学不足以完成这项任务。或许我们可以理性地解释邪恶的起源；也许我们可以证明所有苦难的存在是应得的或必要的。但即使乐观主义者是正确的，神正论对于解决痛苦和悲伤的生活经历也无济于事。因此，理性探究并不是邪恶问题答案的结束，而是答案的开始。它可以向我们展示同情、安慰和希望在哪里是必要的，但它本身无法提供这些。这种对邪恶问题的伦理意义以及面对苦难时哲学的使用和局限性的关注也告诉我们最后的结论。暗物质的部分和章节。本章的副标题是“悲观主义作为道德源泉”，旨在将前述的教训应用于现在（395）。Van Der Lugt 表示，这项任务之所以紧迫，有两个原因。首先，范德鲁格特对当代自我实现的福音持谨慎态度。有人告诉你，只要你足够努力，你就可以成为任何人，这有一个黑暗的一面：“如果我们不快乐，我们就做错了”（402）。其次，除了普遍存在的贬低格言斯多葛主义之外，范德鲁格特还担心，我们越来越多地接触互联网和大众媒体提供的对苦难的描述，会耗尽我们的同情能力。折磨致死的人与虚构地描述折磨致死的行为之间存在明显的道德差异。但范德鲁格特提出，从观众的角度来看，观看这些描述作为娱乐的有害影响似乎是相似的。因此，根据范德鲁格特的观点，我们在贝林的悲观主义传统和辩论中发现：不仅遵循了一个被忽视的、令人着迷的哲学传统，而且还遵循了必要的纠正。因为悲观主义最好的表现并不是预测事情会变得糟糕。相反，它提醒人们生命的脆弱性，以及同情、安慰和希望的重要性。 作为一部思想史，《暗物质》非常出色。范德鲁格特自始至终以清晰、活力和微妙的方式追溯了现代早期的悲观主义传统。研究哲学家的学科专家可能会抱怨范德鲁格特很少就有争议的解释发表意见，但范德鲁格特对这些问题毫不关心。《暗物质》的故事是贝尔之后悲观主义和乐观主义的故事，因此，例如，康德最终是否认为神正论是不可能的，这并不重要。同样，有些人可能会抱怨重要人物被排除在叙述之外。然而，正如范德鲁格特指出的那样，《暗物质》中包含的思想史并不是详尽无遗的（396）。这项工作的目的是恢复悲观主义作为一种道德立场，而不是全面记录每一个可以被称为悲观或乐观的立场。最后，有些人可能会发现她愿意在最后一章中放弃哲学距离的表象是不体面的。这当然是非常规的，但这位读者赞赏她愿意承担风险。此外，前面的论点证明了实际转向的合理性。将价值导向的悲观主义视为纯粹的心理练习，就违背了《暗物质》所希望复兴的传统。因此，就本书的重点、选择性和实践导向而言，范德鲁格特的决定都是合理的。但它们也是有代价的。就我而言，最麻烦的是第一个，它似乎有时会剥​​夺读者的见多识广的洞察力。例如，范德鲁格特在她关于叔本华的章节的结尾处写道，“[叔本华反对自杀的论点]是否有效是另一个问题：我的观点仅仅是叔本华的回应结构似乎是正确的”（383）。范德鲁格特不想在这里发表意见并提出无关紧要的话题，这是可以理解的。然而，到目前为止，在如此有能力的指导下，无论是在这里还是在其他方面，我不禁对她没有冒险发表意见感到失望。从风格上来说，这本书不仅写得很好，而且充满了幽默和人性。鉴于主题，这些属性既有用又必要。例如，在一个小作家的手中，对自杀的哲学理由的讨论可能会令人感到压抑，更不用说危险了。然而范德鲁格特以关怀和同情心管理着它们，同时又不牺牲哲学的严谨性。总而言之，《暗物质》对于理解经常被忽视的价值导向悲观主义传统做出了重大贡献。我们无法确定它最终是否会激发人们对这一传统的进一步兴趣，或者这一传统在哲学家身上的体现方式。正如范德鲁格特所指出的，哲学时尚是不可预测的（105）。然而，这无疑是一部内容丰富、令人惊讶的令人愉快的作品，它极大地揭示了人类存在的阴暗面。最麻烦的是第一个，它似乎有时会剥​​夺读者的见识。例如，范德鲁格特在她关于叔本华的章节的结尾处写道，“[叔本华反对自杀的论点]是否有效是另一个问题：我的观点仅仅是叔本华的回应结构似乎是正确的”（383）。范德鲁格特不想在这里发表意见并提出无关紧要的话题，这是可以理解的。然而，到目前为止，在如此有能力的指导下，无论是在这里还是在其他方面，我不禁对她没有冒险发表意见感到失望。从风格上来说，这本书不仅写得很好，而且充满了幽默和人性。鉴于主题，这些属性既有用又必要。例如，在一个小作家的手中，对自杀的哲学理由的讨论可能会令人感到压抑，更不用说危险了。然而范德鲁格特以关怀和同情心管理着它们，同时又不牺牲哲学的严谨性。总而言之，《暗物质》对于理解经常被忽视的价值导向悲观主义传统做出了重大贡献。我们无法确定它最终是否会激发人们对这一传统的进一步兴趣，或者这一传统在哲学家身上的体现方式。正如范德鲁格特所指出的，哲学时尚是不可预测的（105）。然而，这无疑是一部内容丰富、令人惊讶的令人愉快的作品，它极大地揭示了人类存在的阴暗面。最麻烦的是第一个，它似乎有时会剥​​夺读者的见识。例如，范德鲁格特在她关于叔本华的章节的结尾处写道，“[叔本华反对自杀的论点]是否有效是另一个问题：我的观点仅仅是叔本华的回应结构似乎是正确的”（383）。范德鲁格特不想在这里发表意见并提出无关紧要的话题，这是可以理解的。然而，到目前为止，在如此有能力的指导下，无论是在这里还是在其他方面，我不禁对她没有冒险发表意见感到失望。从风格上来说，这本书不仅写得很好，而且充满了幽默和人性。鉴于主题，这些属性既有用又必要。例如，在一个小作家的手中，对自杀的哲学理由的讨论可能会令人感到压抑，更不用说危险了。然而范德鲁格特以关怀和同情心管理着它们，同时又不牺牲哲学的严谨性。总而言之，《暗物质》对于理解经常被忽视的价值导向悲观主义传统做出了重大贡献。我们无法确定它最终是否会激发人们对这一传统的进一步兴趣，或者这一传统在哲学家身上的体现方式。正如范德鲁格特所指出的，哲学时尚是不可预测的（105）。然而，这无疑是一部内容丰富、令人惊讶的令人愉快的作品，它极大地揭示了人类存在的阴暗面。