Private equity (PE) investors invest in a portfolio of firms, setting new, ambitious performance aspirations and providing monitoring and value-adding services to help management attain these aspirations. Integrating a behavioral theory of the firm and corporate governance perspective, this study investigates how portfolio firms respond to performance feedback, considering heterogeneity in PE investors' incentives and influence toward a given portfolio firm's strategic actions. Using unique data from a PE investor including direct aspirations measures, we find that (1) portfolio firms' performance relative to aspirations, and (2) the PE investor's relative investment amounts and experience of PE-appointed board members, interact to affect the distinct growth strategies (i.e., internal capital investments or external acquisitions) its portfolio firms pursue.

中文翻译：

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同一所有者，不同的影响：私募股权投资者的投资组合公司对绩效反馈的反应有何不同

私募股权 (PE) 投资者投资于公司投资组合，设定新的、雄心勃勃的业绩目标，并提供监控和增值服务以帮助管理层实现这些目标。本研究结合公司行为理论和公司治理视角，研究投资组合公司如何响应绩效反馈，考虑私募股权投资者激励的异质性以及对特定投资组合公司战略行动的影响。使用私募股权投资者的独特数据（包括直接愿望衡量指标），我们发现（1）投资组合公司相对于愿望的业绩，以及（2）私募股权投资者的相对投资金额和私募股权任命的董事会成员的经验，相互作用，影响不同的其投资组合公司追求的增长战略（即内部资本投资或外部收购）。