The European Union (EU) is a democratic organization but faces severe cases of democratic backsliding. The literature deems the EU a hospitable environment for and reluctant to reign in backsliding. This study focuses on the tactics that backsliding governments employ to preserve this hospitable environment and the conditions under which they succeed. I argue that backsliding governments seek to repurpose the practice of accommodation that permeates EU decision-making for the protection of their backsliding projects. Doing so promises backsliders an escape from their precarious bargaining position in a democratic organization but comes with constraints. Backsliders must limit opposition carefully to a subset of EU competences, backsliding-inhibiting competences, that threaten their backsliding projects the most. Moreover, they can only rely on accommodation in the Council if the democratic member states perceive opposition as justified and remain insulated from political accountability by Europe’s parliaments. I present evidence based on quantitative and qualitative analyses of bargaining positions, processes, and outcomes in EU decision-making. The results have implications for understanding the EU’s autocratic predicament, the opportunities of backsliding governments, and the role of autocracies in regional and international organizations.

欧盟（EU）是一个民主组织，但面临着严重的民主倒退。文献认为欧盟是一个友好的环境，并且不愿意控制倒退。本研究的重点是倒退政府为保护这一友好环境而采取的策略以及它们取得成功的条件。我认为，倒退的政府试图重新调整渗透到欧盟决策中的通融做法，以保护其倒退的项目。这样做可以让倒退者摆脱在民主组织中不稳定的谈判地位，但也有限制。倒退者必须谨慎地将反对限制在欧盟能力的一部分，即倒退抑制能力，这对他们的倒退项目威胁最大。此外，如果民主成员国认为反对是合理的，并且仍然不受欧洲议会的政治问责，那么它们只能依靠安理会的妥协。我根据对欧盟决策中的谈判立场、过程和结果的定量和定性分析来提供证据。研究结果对于理解欧盟的专制困境、倒退政府的机会以及专制国家在区域和国际组织中的作用具有重要意义。