Sustaining Democracy is Robert Talisse’s well-argued follow-up to his previous book, Overdoing Democracy. Talisse has argued that American political polarization endangers democracy. The problem occurs when Americans allow their politics to become their identity and, in doing so, lose crosscutting identities, religious, familial, and civic. We not only lose the intrinsic value of those identities; we overdo democracy, and make it worse.In Sustaining Democracy, Talisse explores the political mindset that can sustain a democratic society. How must a citizen regard her opponents? The requisite attitude requires facing up to what Talisse calls the democrat’s dilemma. This is “the tension between the moral requirement to recognize the equality of political opponents and the moral directive to pursue and promote political justice” (4). This state of mind means allowing injustice to win for a time. If citizens do not allow injustice to rule, they must reject the political equality of their opponents. Our opponents see justice differently than we do. They sometimes win elections. If we insist on our own vision of justice, we will want to restrict the political equality of others. So, democratic citizens either allow injustice or violate political equality. What do we do?Talisse argues that sustaining democracy involves honoring political equality. The good citizen must recognize political equality and his biases about justice. Bearing both in mind, the good citizen can allow injustice to prevail for a time. And in doing so, he honors his opponents and sustains democracy with them.Many people fear that we must sometimes suspend democracy to promote justice, but if people are political equals, we cannot do this. Not always.Chapter 1 stresses that democracy involves political equality: politics is how equal persons govern themselves together. So democracy is a moral proposal, not merely a practical one. Citizens have to see others as part of a collective project, which means everyone gets an equal say. Indeed, they are entitled to one. That does not mean one must give in to their opponents’ views, only honor them in the democratic process. There is no complicity in injustice here. Citizens acknowledge a moral burden to discharge their civic duties to promote justice. Nonetheless, chapter 2 explains why democracy requires letting the opposition govern.Chapter 3 shows how belief polarization can exacerbate the democrat’s dilemma. Talisse suggests ways to overcome belief polarization. If Reba resists belief polarization, she can see the values and views she shared with others. Reba’s reflections may reduce her temptation to view political losses as disastrous. So she must scrutinize her own political thinking to locate her biases and correct them where she can (especially biases that lead her to delegitimize electoral victories). The belief that others misunderstand justice does not undermine the legitimacy of an election.Chapter 4 explores strategies to engage those with competing partisan loyalties. These forms of engagement are helpful but not adequate to sustain democratic politics. Indeed, some forms of political engagement can degrade the polity. Talisse invites readers to recognize that they have belief polarization and should respond by engaging reasonable criticisms of their political opinions.The second solution to belief polarization involves putting “political distance” between ourselves and other citizens. Citizens should sometimes step back from political participation, even retreat into social “solitude” on political matters. In the epilogue, Talisse stresses what citizens owe the other side of the political aisle: to become a more moral and effective political opponent.Talisse’s book is a work of public philosophy. Readers should not expect Talisse to engage every objection a professional democratic theorist might offer. But one can still raise concerns.I find Talisse’s articulation of the democrat’s dilemma illuminating. Democratic citizenship does require balancing two moral considerations: that we are right about justice and that others are our political equals. The tension resolves only if citizens allow those with incorrect views about justice to prevail. At least for an election cycle.True, grave injustices might entail restricting democracy. If a democratic president wins election by promising genocide, someone should stop the public from electing him. But in democratic politics, this scenario is rarer than often thought. Talisse argues that people are often mistaken about why others believe as they do, and in many cases, they simply do not know what they believe. One can impute false arguments and motives to them, making our opponents seem scary. The democrat’s dilemma creates genuine cognitive dissonance. But to honor our opponents, we must learn to live in that state of mind. Otherwise, we will undermine, rather than sustain, democratic institutions.The democrat’s dilemma generalizes to other features of open societies. Liberal societies face a related free speech dilemma. Others engage in offensive and immoral speech, but citizens allow it for the sake of other social goods. Markets raise a similar challenge. People may buy and sell goods some dislike. But if citizens want to honor one another’s property rights, even in a mixed economy, they must show forbearance. So, in one way, the dilemma Talisse identifies arises in many contexts, which Talisse might have acknowledged. His argument strengthens if the dilemma is a kind of familiar cognitive tension.I would not characterize the democrat’s dilemma as concerned primarily with disagreements about justice. The dilemma arises for other disagreements. Some citizens might not think about politics within a justice framework. Some Christians believe the Gospel means politics should transcend justice: public policy should focus on care, mercy, and grace. But these Christians will encounter a similar democrat’s dilemma.In Talisse’s defense, claims of justice might have unique properties. Injustice provokes emotional responses and actions in ways that other disagreements do not. Justice must be done. And when someone commits an injustice, citizens must spring into action. Many social philosophers have recognized this, and so, if we want to defend Talisse, one can argue that injustice renders the dilemma acute.The reader need also consider a broader array of responses to the democrat’s dilemma than Talisse offers. Imagine you find Roe v. Wade just. But you also know that when judges decide contentious issues, they distort our politics. People will vote for otherwise odious politicians based on judicial nominees alone and so ignore other vital issues.Citizens face the democrat’s dilemma in the near term: sometimes a pro-life or pro-choice president will win, and their judges prevail. But one might argue that the democrat’s dilemma dissolves at the federal level if the public decentralizes abortion policy. Citizens can set abortion aside in national elections, and neither side must convince themselves to tolerate an unjust abortion regime. They relocate the dispute to states, which contain more internal consensus on the issue. This is not odd. Democratic societies often decentralize political decisions to resolve conflicts.One might take issue with another matter—namely, Talisse’s focus on personal ethics. Yes, citizens must face the tension between true justice and respect for political equality. And yes, they must learn to live with it. But most people’s ordinary attitudes will not change by reflecting on the democrat’s dilemma. Talisse knows that social factors determine our political attitudes. In light of this, I found it a bit odd that Talisse’s recommendations focus so much on the individual. If the reader buys Talisse’s arguments, she may still find it too challenging to resist tribal forces. Her environment must change to ensure she can develop the necessary mindset.Here Talisse can again recommend that we develop crosscutting identities. Then we can free ourselves from tribalism if we affiliate with another one of our groups. That’s good advice. But I still worry that unilateral action lacks proper realism. Theorists and policy makers must also examine institutional reforms that improve democracy, such as adopting electoral procedures that generate more than two parties. With three or more options, people might develop more nuanced political attitudes. This and other suggestions can add up. The implication is that these institutional reforms may sustain democracy far better than individual action.Talisse’s sage advice may become practical only if it accompanies institutional reforms. Yes, perhaps one must begin with attitude change. But I am not sure. Some polarization-reducing and trust-raising reforms may work even in the current political environment.Some argue that campaign finance reform can reduce polarization. Agenda setters in legislatures engage in negative agenda setting: preventing votes, often to benefit donors and friends. With negative agenda setting, legislatures can resolve disputes through deliberation and voting. They cannot vote on legislation that addresses pressing social problems.But negative agenda setting is not (yet) a polarized issue. Indeed, few people know about it. But reforms here could greatly improve the democratic process.I agree with Talisse’s solution. But Talisse overemphasizes disagreement about justice, and his solution places excess weight on personal ethics. Nonetheless, Sustaining Democracy is an insightful, clear work from a seasoned democratic theorist with much to teach the reflective democratic public.

中文翻译：

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维持民主：我们欠对方什么

《维持民主》是罗伯特·塔利斯 (Robert Talisse) 对其上一本书《过度民主》(Overdoing Democracy) 的颇有争议的续作。塔利斯认为，美国政治两极分化危及民主。当美国人允许他们的政治成为他们的身份时，问题就会出现，从而失去宗教、家庭和公民等交叉身份。我们不仅失去了这些身份的内在价值；而且还失去了这些身份的内在价值。在《维持民主》一书中，塔利斯探索了能够维持民主社会的政治思维方式。一个公民必须如何看待她的对手？必要的态度需要正视塔利斯所说的民主困境。这是“承认政治对手平等的道德要求与追求和促进政治正义的道德指令之间的紧张关系”（4）。这种心态意味着允许不公正暂时获胜。如果公民不允许不公正统治，他们就必须拒绝对手的政治平等。我们的对手对正义的看法与我们不同。他们有时会赢得选举。如果我们坚持自己的正义愿景，我们就会想要限制他人的政治平等。因此，民主公民要么允许不公正，要么违反政治平等。我们该怎么办？塔利斯认为，维持民主涉及尊重政治平等。好公民必须认识到政治平等和他对正义的偏见。牢记这两点，好公民可以允许不公正现象暂时存在。通过这样做，他尊重他的对手并与他们一起维护民主。许多人担心我们有时必须暂停民主以促进正义，但如果人们在政治上平等，我们就不能这样做。并非总是如此。第一章强调民主涉及政治平等：政治是平等的人共同治理自己的方式。因此，民主是一种道德建议，而不仅仅是一种实际建议。公民必须将其他人视为集体项目的一部分，这意味着每个人都有平等的发言权。事实上，他们有权拥有一份。这并不意味着必须屈服于对手的观点，而只是在民主进程中尊重他们。这里不存在共谋不公正的情况。公民承认履行公民义务以促进正义的道德负担。尽管如此，第二章解释了为什么民主需要让反对派执政。第三章展示了信仰两极分化如何加剧民主党的困境。泰利斯提出了克服信仰两极分化的方法。如果瑞巴抵制信仰两极分化，她就能看到她与他人分享的价值观和观点。雷巴的反思可能会减少她将政治损失视为灾难性的诱惑。因此，她必须审视自己的政治思维，找出自己的偏见，并尽可能纠正它们（尤其是那些导致她破坏选举胜利合法性的偏见）。相信其他人误解正义并不会损害选举的合法性。第四章探讨了吸引具有竞争性党派忠诚度的人的策略。这些形式的参与有帮助，但不足以维持民主政治。事实上，某些形式的政治参与可能会削弱政体。塔利斯邀请读者认识到他们存在信仰两极分化，应该通过对自己的政治观点进行合理批评来做出回应。信仰两极分化的第二个解决方案是在我们自己和其他公民之间保持“政治距离”。公民有时应该退出政治参与，甚至在政治问题上退回到社会“孤独”。在结语中，塔利斯强调了公民对政治通道另一方的义务：成为更有道德、更有效的政治对手。塔利斯的书是一部公共哲学著作。读者不应期望塔利斯会回应专业民主理论家可能提出的所有反对意见。但人们仍然可以提出担忧。我发现塔利斯对民主党困境的阐述很有启发性。民主公民身份确实需要平衡两个道德考虑：我们对正义的看法是正确的，以及其他人在政治上与我们平等。只有当公民允许那些对正义持有不正确观点的人占上风时，紧张局势才能得到解决。至少在一个选举周期内是这样。确实，严重的不公正可能会限制民主。如果一位民主总统通过承诺种族灭绝赢得选举，就应该有人阻止公众选举他。但在民主政治中，这种情况比人们通常想象的要罕见。塔利斯认为，人们常常会误解别人为何相信自己的观点，而且在很多情况下，他们根本不知道自己相信什么。人们可以将错误的论点和动机归咎于他们，让我们的对手看起来很可怕。民主党的困境造成了真正的认知失调。但为了尊重我们的对手，我们必须学会以这种心态生活。否则，我们将破坏而不是维持民主制度。民主主义者的困境可以推广到开放社会的其他特征。自由社会面临着相关的言论自由困境。其他人发表攻击性和不道德的言论，但公民为了其他社会利益而允许这种言论。市场也提出了类似的挑战。人们可能会买卖一些不喜欢的商品。但如果公民想要尊重彼此的财产权，即使是在混合经济中，他们也必须表现出宽容。因此，在某种程度上，塔利斯所指出的困境在许多情况下都会出现，塔利斯可能已经承认了这一点。如果这种困境是一种熟悉的认知紧张，那么他的论点就会得到加强。我不会将民主党人的困境描述为主要涉及正义方面的分歧。其他分歧也会导致困境。一些公民可能不会在正义框架内思考政治。一些基督徒相信福音意味着政治应该超越正义：公共政策应该关注关怀、怜悯和恩典。但这些基督徒将遇到类似的民主党困境。 在塔利斯的辩护中，正义的主张可能具有独特的属性。不公正会引发情绪反应和行动，而其他分歧则不会。正义必须得到伸张。当有人犯下不公正行为时，公民必须立即采取行动。许多社会哲学家已经认识到这一点，因此，如果我们想为塔利斯辩护，我们可以说，不公正使这一困境变得尖锐。读者还需要考虑比塔利斯提供的更广泛的对民主党困境的回应。想象一下，你发现罗伊诉韦德案是正义的。但你也知道，当法官裁决有争议的问题时，他们扭曲了我们的政治。人们会仅仅根据司法提名人来投票给其他可恶的政客，从而忽略其他重要问题。公民在短期内面临民主党的困境：有时反堕胎或支持堕胎的总统会获胜，而他们的法官会占上风。但有人可能会说，如果公众下放堕胎政策，民主党的困境就会在联邦一级得到解决。公民可以在全国选举中搁置堕胎，任何一方都不能说服自己容忍不公正的堕胎制度。他们将争端转移到各国，而各国在这个问题上达成了更多的内部共识。这并不奇怪。民主社会经常通过分散政治决策来解决冲突。人们可能会对另一件事提出异议，即塔利斯对个人道德的关注。是的，公民必须面对真正正义与尊重政治平等之间的紧张关系。是的，他们必须学会忍受它。但大多数人的普通态度不会因为反思民主党的困境而改变。塔利斯知道社会因素决定我们的政治态度。有鉴于此，我觉得泰利斯的建议如此关注个人有点奇怪。如果读者相信塔丽丝的论点，她可能仍然会发现抵抗部落力量太具有挑战性。她的环境必须改变，以确保她能够形成必要的心态。在这里，泰利斯可以再次建议我们发展跨领域的身份。然后，如果我们加入另一个群体，我们就可以摆脱部落主义。这是个好建议。但我仍然担心单边行动缺乏适当的现实主义。理论家和政策制定者还必须研究改善民主的制度改革，例如采用产生两个以上政党的选举程序。有了三个或更多的选择，人们可能会形成更加微妙的政治态度。这个建议和其他建议可以相加。这意味着这些制度改革可能比个人行动更好地维持民主。塔利斯的明智建议只有与制度改革相结合才可能变得实用。是的，也许我们必须从改变态度开始。但我不确定。即使在当前的政治环境下，一些减少两极分化和增强信任的改革也可能发挥作用。一些人认为，竞选财务改革可以减少两极分化。立法机关的议程制定者参与消极的议程设置：阻止投票，通常是为了让捐助者和朋友受益。通过消极议程设置，立法机关可以通过审议和投票来解决争议。他们无法对解决紧迫社会问题的立法进行投票。但消极的议程设置还不是一个两极分化的问题。确实，很少有人知道这件事。但这里的改革可以极大地改善民主进程。我同意塔利斯的解决方案。但塔利斯过分强调关于正义的分歧，他的解决方案过分重视个人道德。尽管如此，《维持民主》是一位经验丰富的民主理论家的一部富有洞察力、清晰的著作，对反思性的民主公众有很多启发。