Stalnaker’s Thesis about indicative conditionals says, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional is equal to the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. Skyrms’s Thesis about counterfactual conditionals says, roughly, that the probability that one ought to assign to a counterfactual conditional equals one’s rational expectation of the chance, at a relevant past time, of its consequent conditional on its antecedent. In this article, I develop a new uniform theory of conditionals that allows us to derive a tenable version of Skyrms’s Thesis from a tenable version of Stalnaker’s Thesis, together with a chance-deference relating rational credence to beliefs about objective chance.

中文翻译：

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反事实概率

斯塔纳克关于指示性条件句的论文粗略地说，人们应该分配给指示性条件句的概率等于人们应该根据其先行词分配给结果条件式的概率。斯凯姆斯关于反事实条件句的论文粗略地说，一个人应该分配给一个反事实条件句的概率等于一个人在过去的相关时间对其结果条件对其先行条件的机会的理性预期。在这篇文章中，我开发了一种新的统一条件理论，使我们能够从斯塔纳克论文的成立版本中推导出斯凯姆斯论文的成立版本，以及将理性可信度与客观机会信念联系起来的机会尊重。