Visionary CEOs have strong beliefs about the right course of action for their firms. How should a board of directors that does not necessarily share the visionary CEO's confidence advise and monitor the CEO? We consider a model in which the board can acquire costly information about the firm's optimal strategic direction. The board not only advises the CEO on strategy, but also must approve it, and the CEO exerts effort to implement the strategy. We find that the board gathers less information when the CEO believes more strongly in his vision. Further, depending on the strength of the CEO's belief bias, the board either plays an advisory role, a monitoring role, or a rubberstamping role. The model predicts that in firms that are led by highly visionary CEOs, boards are passive in that they acquire little information and rubberstamp the visionary's proposal. Nevertheless, shareholders prefer the visionary over an unbiased manager in industries in which obtaining information about the correct course of action is difficult and costly.

中文翻译：

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在拥有有远见的首席执行官的公司中，董事会扮演什么角色？

有远见的首席执行官对其公司的正确行动方针抱有坚定的信念。一个不一定认同有远见的首席执行官的董事会应该如何向首席执行官提供建议和监督？我们考虑一种模型，在该模型中，董事会可以获得有关公司最佳战略方向的昂贵信息。董事会不仅向CEO提出战略建议，还必须批准战略，而CEO则努力实施战略。我们发现，当首席执行官对自己的愿景更加坚信时，董事会收集的信息就会减少。此外，根据首席执行官信念偏见的强度，董事会要么扮演顾问角色，要么扮演监督角色，要么扮演橡皮图章角色。该模型预测，在由高瞻远瞩的首席执行官领导的公司中，董事会是被动的，因为他们获取的信息很少，也很少批准高瞻远瞩公司的建议。然而，在获取有关正确行动方针的信息既困难又昂贵的行业中，股东更喜欢有远见的人，而不是公正的经理。