We examine how the decentralization of public employment services (PES) affects the behavior and service provision of PES offices and the labor market outcomes of job seekers. We use difference-in-differences, utilizing a Finnish temporary reform during which PES were decentralized for specific groups of job seekers in treated municipalities and remained centralized for others. The reform presented the treated municipalities with the possibility of shifting costs to the central government. We find no evidence of better labor market outcomes and find evidence consistent with municipalities being able to shift 10% of their unemployment benefit costs to the central government.

中文翻译：

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公共就业服务分权与地方政府的激励措施

我们研究公共就业服务（PES）的权力下放如何影响公共就业服务办公室的行为和服务提供以及求职者的劳动力市场结果。我们采用双重差异法，利用芬兰的一项临时改革，在该改革期间，PES 被下放给受处理城市中的特定求职者群体，而对其他群体则保持集中。这项改革为受处理的城市提供了将成本转移给中央政府的可能性。我们没有发现劳动力市场结果更好的证据，并且找到了与市政当局能够将 10% 的失业救济成本转移给中央政府相一致的证据。