Using the public release of comment letters on EDGAR to capture a regime shift toward regulatory transparency, we examine whether an increase in transparency affects regulators’ effort and work performance. We find that the SEC staff reviews more filings and more documents per filing following the disclosure regime shift. These effects are incrementally stronger for firms with comment letters that are expected to attract greater investor or public monitoring. Furthermore, under the new regime, reviews are more timely. Upon the regime switch, the likelihood of a restatement (receiving a comment letter) decreases (increases) for filings that are reviewed. After receiving a comment letter, a firm with signs of potential fraud is more likely to be investigated, and this effect becomes more pronounced under the new regime. Altogether, our findings suggest that publicly disclosing regulators’ work output can mitigate moral hazard (i.e., increase regulators’ work input), improving their work performance.

中文翻译：

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监管透明度和监管机构的努力：来自 SEC 审查工作公开发布的证据

通过公开发布关于 EDGAR 的评论信来捕捉监管透明度的制度转变，我们研究了透明度的增加是否会影响监管机构的努力和工作绩效。我们发现，在披露制度转变后，美国证券交易委员会的工作人员审查了更多的文件，并且每份文件审查了更多的文件。对于那些预计会吸引更多投资者或公众监督的发表评论信的公司来说，这些影响会逐渐增强。此外，在新制度下，审查更加及时。制度转换后，经审查的申请重述（收到评论信）的可能性会降低（增加）。收到评论信后，有潜在欺诈迹象的公司更有可能受到调查，这种效果在新制度下变得更加明显。总而言之，我们的研究结果表明，公开披露监管机构的工作成果可以减轻道德风险（即增加监管机构的工作投入），提高其工作绩效。