By justification we understand what makes a belief epistemologically viable: generally this is considered knowledge that is true. The problem is defining this with a higher degree of precision because this is where different conflicting conceptions appear. On the one hand, we can understand justification as what makes it reasonable to acquire or maintain a belief; on the other, it is what increases the probability that the belief is true. This work tries to prove that beliefs depend on other beliefs that are epistemically justified and that such beliefs are the result of (i.e., they arise from) our privileged intuition of reality. For this, we examine the concept of epistemic regress. Epistemic reasons authorize a proposition P to be the conclusion of an argument in which such reasons function as premises and are vulnerable to epistemic regress. The three most important approaches to epistemic regress are Infinitism, Coherentism and Foundationalism.

通过论证，我们了解是什么使某种信念在认识论上可行：通常这被认为是真实的知识。问题在于以更高的精确度来定义这一点，因为这是出现不同冲突概念的地方。一方面，我们可以将正当性理解为使获得或维持某种信念变得合理的原因；另一方面，它增加了信念为真的概率。这项工作试图证明信念依赖于其他在认识上合理的信念，并且这些信念是我们对现实的特权直觉的结果（即它们源于）。为此，我们研究认知回归的概念。认知理由授权命题 P 作为论证的结论，其中这些理由充当前提并且容易受到认知回归的影响。认知回归的三种最重要的方法是无限主义、连贯主义和基础主义。