Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar.

中文翻译：

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银行监管资本成本

巴塞尔一号协议引入了未提取承诺的资本要求，但仅限于原始期限超过一年的左轮手枪。我们利用这种监管不连续性来估计资本监管对信贷成本和构成的影响。巴塞尔一号协议出台后，短期承诺费用相对于长期承诺有所下降，短期融资额度的发放有所增加。我们的结果凸显了信贷供应对资本监管的敏感性，特别是对于资本较少的银行。我们可以推断，低资本银行愿意放弃两倍的手续费收入，以减少一美元所需的监管资本。