A CEO's short horizon and associated myopic actions are typically viewed as detrimental to the firm. In contrast, studying a voluntary disclosure model wherein capital market and product market strategic considerations are in play, we show that the CEO's myopic behavior can improve a firm's long-term value. In particular, the disclosures of a long-horizon CEO are seen as being entirely focused on the firm's interests and thus as being exploitative of customers. A short-horizon CEO myopically focused on short-term stock price is less aligned with the firm and, consequently, her disclosures are more customer friendly. As a corollary, when no disclosure is forthcoming, customers are less skeptical that the myopic CEO is withholding information to exploit them. This improves customers' willingness to pay with a myopic CEO, leading to higher firm profitability. The paper also layers in compensation design to derive the optimal degree of managerial short-term focus to induce.

中文翻译：

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短期管理关注带来长期公司收益：短视和自愿披露

首席执行官的短视和相关的短视行为通常被认为对公司有害。相比之下，通过研究资本市场和产品市场战略考虑发挥作用的自愿披露模型，我们表明首席执行官的短视行为可以提高公司的长期价值。特别是，长期首席执行官的披露被视为完全关注公司利益，因此是对客户的剥削。目光短浅、关注短期股价的首席执行官与公司的一致性较差，因此，她的披露对客户更加友好。推论，当没有披露任何信息时，客户就不会那么怀疑短视的首席执行官隐瞒信息以利用他们。这提高了客户为短视首席执行官付费的意愿，从而提高公司的盈利能力。本文还对薪酬设计进行了分层，以得出管理层短期关注的最佳程度。