This paper examines the role of peer firm disclosures in shaping corporate research and development (R&D) investments. Drawing on models of two-stage R&D races, I hypothesize that a firm could be either deterred or encouraged by peer disclosure of interim R&D success, depending on peer firms’ R&D strength in the race. Using granular, project-level data on clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a firm's R&D investments in a specific therapeutic area are deterred by disclosures of early-phase trial initiation from strong rivals in the same area but encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. Cross-sectional analyses show that focal firm strength and disclosure relevance moderate the effects of peer firm disclosure. Overall, my evidence suggests that peer firms’ R&D disclosures can have both proprietary costs and deterrence benefits.

中文翻译：

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竞争对手自愿披露后的企业研发投资：来自药物开发过程的证据

本文探讨了同行公司披露在影响企业研发（R&D）投资方面的作用。借鉴两阶段研发竞赛的模型，我假设一家公司可能会因同行披露中期研发成功而受到阻止或鼓励，具体取决于同行公司在竞赛中的研发实力。使用药物开发过程中临床试验的详细项目级数据，我发现一家公司在特定治疗领域的研发投资会因同一领域强大竞争对手披露的早期试验启动而受到阻碍，但会受到来自同一领域强大竞争对手的披露的鼓励。弱小的对手。横断面分析表明，焦点公司实力和披露相关性调节了同行公司披露的影响。总体而言，我的证据表明，同行公司的研发披露既可以带来专有成本，也可以带来威慑效益。