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Are entrepreneurs penalized during job searches? It depends on who is hiring
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal ( IF 5.4 ) Pub Date : 2023-09-17 , DOI: 10.1002/sej.1479 Waverly W. Ding 1 , Hyeun J. Lee 2 , Debra L. Shapiro 1
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal ( IF 5.4 ) Pub Date : 2023-09-17 , DOI: 10.1002/sej.1479 Waverly W. Ding 1 , Hyeun J. Lee 2 , Debra L. Shapiro 1
Affiliation
How do job-applicants with entrepreneurship experience—“post-entrepreneurs”—fare in the wage labor job market? We propose an “entrepreneurship-experience penalty” generally occurs yet varies in strength depending on the recruiters faced by post-entrepreneurs in their job application process. In an experiment utilizing the selection-decisions of 275 recruiters (experimental study participants) in reaction to objectively-identical job-applicants' resumes whose differences relate to whether their last-held job was as a Founder or as an Executive, we found that: (a) resumes of Founders (compared to Executives) are about 23%–29% less likely to be picked as top-choice for hire, (b) this entrepreneurship penalty is weaker for recruiters with (rather than without) entrepreneurial aspirations, and (c) this recruiter moderator-effect is stronger for recruiters in smaller (rather than larger) firms.
中文翻译:
企业家在求职过程中是否受到惩罚?这取决于谁在招聘
具有创业经历的求职者——“后创业者”——在工资劳动力市场上表现如何?我们建议,“创业经验惩罚”通常会发生,但强度有所不同,具体取决于后创业者在求职过程中面临的招聘人员。在一项实验中,275 名招聘人员(实验研究参与者)根据客观上相同的求职者简历做出的选择决定,这些简历的差异与他们最后担任的工作是创始人还是高管有关,我们发现: (a) 创始人的简历(与高管相比)被选为招聘首选的可能性大约为 23%–29%,(b) 对于有(而不是没有)创业抱负的招聘人员来说,这种创业惩罚较弱,并且(c) 对于较小(而不是较大)公司的招聘人员来说,这种招聘人员的调节效应更强。
更新日期:2023-09-17
中文翻译:
企业家在求职过程中是否受到惩罚?这取决于谁在招聘
具有创业经历的求职者——“后创业者”——在工资劳动力市场上表现如何?我们建议,“创业经验惩罚”通常会发生,但强度有所不同,具体取决于后创业者在求职过程中面临的招聘人员。在一项实验中,275 名招聘人员(实验研究参与者)根据客观上相同的求职者简历做出的选择决定,这些简历的差异与他们最后担任的工作是创始人还是高管有关,我们发现: (a) 创始人的简历(与高管相比)被选为招聘首选的可能性大约为 23%–29%,(b) 对于有(而不是没有)创业抱负的招聘人员来说,这种创业惩罚较弱,并且(c) 对于较小(而不是较大)公司的招聘人员来说,这种招聘人员的调节效应更强。