We explore how a supervisor's hierarchical rank affects the extent to which employees’ targets reflect their past performance. Literature documents that supervisors do not fully ratchet targets for past performance, arguably because the commitment not to penalize successful employees with more difficult targets alleviates the severity of the ratchet effect. We argue that commitment is less credible in organizational hierarchies where a middle manager sets employees’ targets. Using data from an organization comprised of three hierarchical layers, we consistently find that a middle manager's exposure to performance pressure is positively associated with the ratcheting of the employees’ targets. Moreover, we show that management at headquarters reduces a middle manager's performance pressure when most of her employees missed their targets in the previous period. Overall, the results imply that the hierarchical rank is an important determinant of the credibility of a supervisor's commitment to deemphasize past performance in target setting.

中文翻译：

---

层次结构中的目标设定：中层管理人员的角色

我们探讨主管的等级级别如何影响员工目标反映其过去绩效的程度。文献表明，主管并没有完全针对过去的绩效设定棘轮目标，这可能是因为承诺不以更困难的目标惩罚成功的员工，从而减轻了棘轮效应的严重性。我们认为，在由中层管理者设定员工目标的组织层次结构中，承诺的可信度较低。使用由三个层次结构组成的组织的数据，我们一致发现中层管理人员面临的绩效压力与员工目标的逐步提高呈正相关。而且，我们发现，当大多数员工未能实现上一时期的目标时，总部的管理层会减轻中层管理人员的绩效压力。总体而言，结果表明，等级排名是主管在目标设定中淡化过去绩效承诺可信度的重要决定因素。