Most autocracies restrict emigration yet still allow some citizens to exit. How do these regimes decide who can leave? We argue that many autocracies strategically target anti-regime actors for emigration, thereby crafting a more loyal population without the drawbacks of persistent co-optation or repression. However, this generates problematic incentives for citizens to join opposition activity to secure exit. In response, autocracies simultaneously punish dissidents for attempting to emigrate, screening out all but the most determined opponents. To test our theory, we examine an original data set coded from over 20,000 pages of declassified emigration applications from East Germany's state archives. In the first individual-level test of an autocracy's emigration decisions, we find that active opposition promoted emigration approval but also punishment for applying. Pensioners were also more likely to secure exit, and professionals were less likely. Our results shed light on global migration's political sources and an overlooked strategy of autocratic resilience.

中文翻译：

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威权政府如何决定谁移民：来自东德的证据

大多数独裁国家限制移民，但仍允许部分公民出境。这些政权如何决定谁可以离开？我们认为，许多独裁国家战略性地将反政权行为者作为移民目标，从而培养出更忠诚的民众，而不会带来持续拉拢或镇压的弊端。然而，这对公民加入反对派活动以确保退出产生了有问题的激励。作为回应，独裁政权同时惩罚试图移民的持不同政见者，排除除了最坚定的反对者之外的所有人。为了检验我们的理论，我们检查了由东德国家档案馆 20,000 多页解密移民申请编码而成的原始数据集。在对独裁政权移民决定的首次个人层面测试中，我们发现，积极的反对促进了移民的批准，但也促进了对申请的惩罚。养老金领取者也更有可能获得退出，而专业人士的可能性则较小。我们的研究结果揭示了全球移民的政治根源和被忽视的专制弹性策略。