Almost all technology is dual use to some degree: it has both civilian and military applications. This feature creates a dilemma for cooperation. States can design arms control institutions to curtail costly competition over some military technology. But they also do not want to limit valuable civilian uses. How does the dual use nature of technology shape the prospects for cooperation? We argue that the duality of technology presents a challenge not by its very existence but rather through the ways it alters information constraints on the design of arms control institutions. We characterize variation in technology along two dual use dimensions: (1) the ease of distinguishing military from civilian uses; and (2) the degree of integration within military enterprises and the civilian economy. Distinguishability drives the level of monitoring needed to detect violations. When a weapon is indistinguishable from its civilian counterpart, states must improve detection though intelligence collection or intrusive inspections. Integration sharpens the costs of disclosing information to another state. For highly integrated technology, demonstrating compliance could expose information about other capabilities, increasing the security risks from espionage. Together, these dimensions generate expectations about the specific information problems states face as they try to devise agreements over various technologies. We introduce a new qualitative data set to assess both variables and their impact on cooperation across all modern armament technologies. The findings lend strong support for the theory. Efforts to control emerging technologies should consider how variation in the dual use attributes shapes this tension between detection and disclosure.

中文翻译：

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双重用途欺骗：技术如何塑造国际关系中的合作

几乎所有技术在某种程度上都是双重用途的：它既有民用又有军事用途。这一特点造成了合作的困境。各国可以设计军备控制机构来限制对某些军事技术的代价高昂的竞争。但他们也不想限制有价值的民用用途。技术的双重用途性质如何塑造合作前景？我们认为，技术的二元性带来的挑战不是其本身的存在，而是其改变军备控制机构设计的信息限制的方式。我们从两个双重用途维度来描述技术的变化：（1）区分军事用途和民用用途的容易程度；(2)军工企业与民用经济的融合程度。可区分性提高了检测违规行为所需的监控水平。当武器与民用武器无法区分时，各国必须通过情报收集或侵入式检查来改进检测。一体化加剧了向另一个国家披露信息的成本。对于高度集成的技术，证明合规性可能会暴露有关其他功能的信息，从而增加间谍活动的安全风险。这些维度共同产生了对各国在试图就各种技术达成一致时所面临的具体信息问题的期望。我们引入了一个新的定性数据集来评估这两个变量及其对所有现代武器技术合作的影响。研究结果为该理论提供了强有力的支持。