While Sani, Shroff and White (2023) examine a plausibly exogenous shock to the information acquisition landscape that arguably changes informed traders’ incentives to generate private information without the focal firm changing its disclosure policy, the causal chain underlying their analyses shares the implicit assumptions employed in the extant empirical literature that tests the Learning Hypothesis. Thus, the focus of our discussion is to make explicit the implicit assumptions and highlight the resulting challenges faced by authors who wish to interpret Investment Sensitivity to Price as evidence of managerial learning. In the end, we suggest future research work to extend our understanding by exploring in greater detail and more directly the What and the How managers learn from outsiders.

尽管 Sani、Shroff 和 White（2023）研究了对信息获取环境的一种看似合理的外生冲击，这种冲击可能会改变知情交易者在焦点公司不改变其披露政策的情况下生成私人信息的动机，但他们分析背后的因果链共享所采用的隐含假设在现有的检验学习假设的实证文献中。因此，我们讨论的重点是明确隐含的假设，并强调那些希望将投资对价格的敏感性解释为管理学习证据的作者所面临的挑战。最后，我们建议未来的研究工作通过更详细、更直接地探索管理者向外部人员学习什么以及如何学习来扩展我们的理解。