This paper examines whether portfolio disclosure requirements for actively managed investment funds affect the investment decisions of the firms they own. We argue that mandatory portfolio disclosures reduce fund managers' incentive to collect and trade on private information, which reduces the stock price informativeness of their portfolio, and thus portfolio firm managers' ability to learn from their firms' stock prices. Using a difference-in-differences design around the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent fund disclosure, we find that investment sensitivity to stock price declines for firms with significant ownership held by actively managed funds affected by the regulation. The decline in investment-price sensitivity is concentrated among firms that are (i) owned by funds with larger expected proprietary costs and (ii) more likely to learn from price. Our results suggest that portfolio disclosure requirements have spillover effects on corporate investment by curtailing managers’ opportunities to learn from price.

本文研究了主动管理投资基金的投资组合披露要求是否会影响其所拥有公司的投资决策。我们认为，强制披露投资组合会降低基金经理收集和交易私人信息的动机，从而降低其投资组合的股价信息量，从而降低投资组合公司经理从其公司股票价格中学习的能力。根据 2004 年 5 月美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 要求更频繁地披露基金的规定，采用双重差分设计，我们发现，对于受该规定影响的积极管理型基金持有大量所有权的公司，其对股价的投资敏感度会下降。投资价格敏感性下降主要集中在以下公司：(i) 由预期专有成本较大的基金所拥有，以及 (ii) 更有可能从价格中学习。我们的结果表明，投资组合披露要求通过减少管理者从价格中学习的机会，对企业投资产生溢出效应。