Well-functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional actions. This phenomenon is often characterized as knowledge of what one is doing and labeled “practical knowledge”. But when we examine it carefully, it seems to require a particular kind of understanding - understanding of the normative structure of one's action. Three lines of argument are offered to support this Necessity of Understanding thesis. The first appeals to the nature of intentional action and the second to our everyday reasons explanation of action. The final line of argument draws on a practical amnesia case in which an agent forgets her overall goal while acting. Implications of the Necessity of Understanding thesis for the widely endorsed non-observational view of practical knowledge are briefly discussed. It is argued that support for the non-observational view is weaker than has been appreciated.

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实际理解

功能良好的主体通常与其意图行为具有良好的认知关系。这种现象通常被描述为对自己正在做的事情的了解，并被贴上“实践知识”的标签。但当我们仔细审视它时，它似乎需要一种特殊的理解——对一个人行为的规范结构的理解。提出了三个论点来支持理解的必要性论文。第一个诉诸于有意行为的本质，​​第二个诉诸于我们对行为的日常原因的解释。最后的论点借鉴了一个实际的失忆症案例，其中特工在行动时忘记了她的总体目标。简要讨论了理解的必要性论文对广泛认可的实践知识非观察观点的影响。有人认为，对非观察性观点的支持比人们想象的要弱。