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Freedom, moral responsibility, and the failure of universal defeat
Philosophical Issues ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2023-08-27 , DOI: 10.1111/phis.12246 Andrew J. Latham 1 , Hannah Tierney 2 , Somogy Varga 1, 3
Philosophical Issues ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2023-08-27 , DOI: 10.1111/phis.12246 Andrew J. Latham 1 , Hannah Tierney 2 , Somogy Varga 1, 3
Affiliation
Proponents of manipulation arguments against compatibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the manipulator intends that an agent perform a particular action) do not impact judgments about free will and moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people's judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: people judged that an agent was less free and responsible when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least one but not all agents) than when the manipulation was universal (impacting every agent). This study examines people's judgements about existential and universal manipulation cases that involve both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation scope also affects people's free will and responsibility judgments in manipulation cases involving both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we also found that manipulation type influences the effect that manipulation scope has on people's free will judgments but not their moral responsibility judgments, which indicates that people's free will and responsibility judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and moral responsibility are conceptually bound together.
中文翻译:
自由、道德责任和普遍失败的失败
反对相容论的操纵论点的支持者认为,操纵范围(操纵了多少主体)和操纵类型(操纵者是否打算让主体执行特定行动)不会影响对自由意志和道德责任的判断。许多操纵论的反对者都认为操纵范围没有影响,但认为操纵类型有影响。Latham 和 Tierney (2022, 2023) 最近的工作发现,人们的判断对操纵范围很敏感:人们认为,当操纵是存在的(影响至少一个但不是所有的代理人)时,代理人的自由度和责任性低于操纵时的自由度和责任感。具有普遍性(影响每个代理人)。这项研究考察了人们对涉及有意和无意结果的存在性和普遍操纵案例的判断。我们发现,在涉及有意和非故意结果的操纵案件中,操纵范围也会影响人们的自由意志和责任判断。有趣的是,我们还发现,操纵类型影响操纵范围对人们自由意志判断的影响,但不影响人们的道德责任判断,这表明人们的自由意志判断和责任判断可能会脱节。这给普遍的假设带来了压力,即关于自由意志和道德责任的判断在概念上是联系在一起的。
更新日期:2023-08-27
中文翻译:
自由、道德责任和普遍失败的失败
反对相容论的操纵论点的支持者认为,操纵范围(操纵了多少主体)和操纵类型(操纵者是否打算让主体执行特定行动)不会影响对自由意志和道德责任的判断。许多操纵论的反对者都认为操纵范围没有影响,但认为操纵类型有影响。Latham 和 Tierney (2022, 2023) 最近的工作发现,人们的判断对操纵范围很敏感:人们认为,当操纵是存在的(影响至少一个但不是所有的代理人)时,代理人的自由度和责任性低于操纵时的自由度和责任感。具有普遍性(影响每个代理人)。这项研究考察了人们对涉及有意和无意结果的存在性和普遍操纵案例的判断。我们发现,在涉及有意和非故意结果的操纵案件中,操纵范围也会影响人们的自由意志和责任判断。有趣的是,我们还发现,操纵类型影响操纵范围对人们自由意志判断的影响,但不影响人们的道德责任判断,这表明人们的自由意志判断和责任判断可能会脱节。这给普遍的假设带来了压力,即关于自由意志和道德责任的判断在概念上是联系在一起的。