ABSTRACT

A contemporary business challenge for bundling theory is the distribution of digital content such as media, entertainment, software, and other information goods. Consumers can use a number of devices to interact with software, online services, music, video, news, and other forms of digital content. For instance, Netflix videos and Kindle ebooks, initially accessed only on television sets and computers, respectively, are now also consumed on smartphones and tablets. Print products are now distributed and consumed both in print and digitally. Firms offer product line designs that include prices for single device access as also bundle discounts for multi-device access, so that consumers can choose a device or even multiple devices. This paper provides guidelines regarding such multi-device product line design and pricing. A starting point is to note that there are many ways to practice bundling, from offering prices for single-device consumption as well as a bundle discount (mixed bundling), to forcing multi-device prices (pure bundling), and designs in between (partial bundling). Picking the best design, and associated prices, is a complex problem due to how single-device demand functions relate to multi-device demand. Recognizing that some dual-device purchases can occur even when there is no bundle discount, the paper develops intuition around the net gain or loss incurred from giving a bundle discount to entice single-device access buyers to dual sales. One surprising finding is that inducing dual sales through bundle discounts can be profitable even when intent to consume multiple times is quite weak, because in this case dual sales would not occur organically. Less surprisingly, such inducement is also profitable when multi-consumption intent is strong, and least attractive when the intent is moderate. When one of the devices is an emerging one or has weak own demand in the short term, then it can be useful to offer a partial bundle, tying sales for the stronger device into a bundle comprising access to both devices. When device valuations are such that consumers generally agree on the rank-ordering of the devices (e.g., if a location-based app offers greater value on a smartphone than on a tablet), then it is best to employ some type of bundling, unless the intent for multi-device consumption is proportionally lower among low-value consumers than for high-value consumers.

摘要

捆绑理论面临的当代商业挑战是媒体、娱乐、软件和其他信息产品等数字内容的分发。消费者可以使用多种设备与软件、在线服务、音乐、视频、新闻和其他形式的数字内容进行交互。例如，Netflix 视频和 Kindle 电子书最初分别只能在电视机和电脑上访问，现在也可以在智能手机和平板电脑上使用。印刷产品现在以印刷和数字方式分发和消费。公司提供的产品线设计包括单设备访问的价格以及多设备访问的捆绑折扣，以便消费者可以选择一个设备甚至多个设备。本文提供了有关此类多设备产品线设计和定价的指南。首先要注意的是，实践捆绑的方法有很多，从提供单设备消费价格以及捆绑折扣（混合捆绑），到强制多设备价格（纯捆绑），以及介于两者之间的设计（部分捆绑）。由于单设备需求函数与多设备需求之间的关系，选择最佳设计和相关价格是一个复杂的问题。认识到即使没有捆绑折扣，某些双设备购买也可能发生，本文对提供捆绑折扣以吸引单设备访问购买者进行双重销售而产生的净收益或损失产生了直觉。一个令人惊讶的发现是，即使多次消费的意愿相当弱，通过捆绑折扣诱导双重销售也可以盈利。因为在这种情况下，双重销售不会有机地发生。不足为奇的是，当多重消费意图强烈时，这种诱导也是有利可图的，而当多重消费意图中等时，这种诱导最没有吸引力。当其中一种设备是新兴设备或短期内自身需求较弱时，提供部分捆绑包可能会很有用，将功能更强的设备的销售捆绑到包含两种设备的访问权限的捆绑包中。当设备估值使得消费者普遍同意设备的排序时（例如，如果基于位置的应用程序在智能手机上比在平板电脑上提供更大的价值），那么最好采用某种类型的捆绑，除非低价值消费者的多设备消费意愿比例低于高价值消费者。当多重消费意图强烈时，这种诱导也是有利可图的，而当多重消费意图中等时，这种诱导最没有吸引力。当其中一种设备是新兴设备或短期内自身需求较弱时，提供部分捆绑包可能会很有用，将功能更强的设备的销售捆绑到包含两种设备的访问权限的捆绑包中。当设备估值使得消费者普遍同意设备的排序时（例如，如果基于位置的应用程序在智能手机上比在平板电脑上提供更大的价值），那么最好采用某种类型的捆绑，除非低价值消费者的多设备消费意愿比例低于高价值消费者。当多重消费意图强烈时，这种诱导也是有利可图的，而当多重消费意图中等时，这种诱导最没有吸引力。当其中一种设备是新兴设备或短期内自身需求较弱时，提供部分捆绑包可能会很有用，将功能更强的设备的销售捆绑到包含两种设备的访问权限的捆绑包中。当设备估值使得消费者普遍同意设备的排序时（例如，如果基于位置的应用程序在智能手机上比在平板电脑上提供更大的价值），那么最好采用某种类型的捆绑，除非低价值消费者的多设备消费意愿比例低于高价值消费者。当其中一种设备是新兴设备或短期内自身需求较弱时，提供部分捆绑包可能会很有用，将功能更强的设备的销售捆绑到包含两种设备的访问权限的捆绑包中。当设备估值使得消费者普遍同意设备的排序时（例如，如果基于位置的应用程序在智能手机上比在平板电脑上提供更大的价值），那么最好采用某种类型的捆绑，除非低价值消费者的多设备消费意愿比例低于高价值消费者。当其中一种设备是新兴设备或短期内自身需求较弱时，提供部分捆绑包可能会很有用，将功能更强的设备的销售捆绑到包含两种设备的访问权限的捆绑包中。当设备估值使得消费者普遍同意设备的排序时（例如，如果基于位置的应用程序在智能手机上比在平板电脑上提供更大的价值），那么最好采用某种类型的捆绑，除非低价值消费者的多设备消费意愿比例低于高价值消费者。